The dynamics of institutional pressures and stakeholder behavior in national electronic health record implementations: a tale of two countries by Klecun, Ela et al.
The dynamics of institutional pressures and stakeholder behavior in 
national electronic health record implementations: a tale of two 
countries
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100397/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Klecun, Ela, Zhou, Ya, Kankanhalli, Atreyi, Wee, Yap Hwee and Hibberd, Ralph 
(2019) The dynamics of institutional pressures and stakeholder behavior in 
national electronic health record implementations: a tale of two countries. Journal
of Information Technology, 34 (4). 292 - 332. ISSN 0268-3962 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0268396218822478
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
 Dynamics of pressures in national EHR implementations 
  
  1 
The Dynamics of Institutional Pressures and Stakeholder Behavior 
in National EHR Implementations: A Tale of Two Countries 
 
Ela Klecun1, Ya Zhou2, Atreyi Kankanhalli3, Yap Hwee Wee3 and Ralph Hibberd1 
1London School of Economics and Political Science, UK 
2The University of Nottingham Ningbo China, China 
3National University of Singapore, Singapore 
 
Cite as:  Klecun, E., Zhou, Y., Kankanhalli, A., Wee, Y. H., & Hibberd, R. (2019). The dynamics of 
institutional pressures and stakeholder behavior in national electronic health record implementations: A tale of 
two countries. Journal of Information Technology. Online first https://doi.org/10.1177/0268396218822478 
 
ABSTRACT  
Through electronic health records (EHRs) implementation, national healthcare systems are aiming for care 
integration and enhancement, as a response to the significant challenges of ageing populations, increasing 
chronic disease burdens, and rising costs. However, the path to large-scale EHR implementation is seldom 
smooth, involving multiple stakeholders with diverse interests and influences. This study proposes a framework 
that draws on both stakeholder and institutional theories to understand the complex dynamics of stakeholder 
interactions and institutional pressures over time during EHR systems implementation. This framework is 
utilized to analyze the national EHR programs of Singapore and England, which provide contrasting perspectives 
on how two top-down system implementations took place with different outcomes. Our results suggest that in 
the Singapore case the presence of boundary spanners, supporting implementation agency that included IT staff 
from healthcare organizations, and greater engagement with medical professionals, were associated with more 
positive dynamics of stakeholder interactions (e.g., limited pushback from professionals or the press) during 
EHR implementation than in England. Differences in the healthcare structures and systems, EHR project 
organization, and the combined influences of institutional pressures shed light on the varying implementation 
paths and outcomes in the two cases. This study adds to the HIT literature through a comparative examination 
of the organizational and social processes during complex national healthcare integration projects. It also 
contributes to the institutional and stakeholder literatures in several ways, in particular by depicting the processes 
and outcomes of the dynamics of isomorphic pressures played out under different institutional conditions. 
Last, our proposed framework provides a useful conceptual tool for analyzing such complex IT implementations 
across multiple stakeholders. 
Keywords: Electronic health records (EHRs), health information technology (HIT), stakeholder attributes, 
institutional pressures, Singapore, England 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
In recent years, developed economies have witnessed growing healthcare costs as both average life 
expectancy and chronic disease burdens increase, costs which are expected to rise substantially by 2060 (OECD, 
2013). These challenges are exacerbated by the fragmentation in many nations’ healthcare systems, which is 
manifest in poor care coordination (Bauchner et al., 2016). In response to these concerns, many nations including 
Singapore, the United Kingdom (UK), Japan and the United States (US) have examined the use of electronic 
health records (EHRs) as a means to enhance care (AcademyHealth 2010). EHRs, defined as longitudinal 
electronic records of patient health information, can act as a foundation for healthcare integration, where 
records follow established standards, are available and can be shared. Unlike Electronic Medical Records 
(EMRs), which are not designed to be shared outside the individual practice, EHR can provide an integrated 
view of a patient’s health history supporting care across organizational boundaries (AHRQ, 2014), and 
potentially improve healthcare efficiency and quality (Currie et al., 2011). Cost efficiencies might also be 
achieved through economies of scale realized through EHR use (Baxter & Lewis, 2010). Aggregated 
national EHR data could also support developments of pharmaceutical drugs and therapies (Kohli and Tan, 
2016). 
 Given the expected benefits, healthcare providers have been subject to institutional pressures from 
national governments to implement EHRs. This is the case in England (Klecun, 2016), Singapore (Kwee, 
2009), and the US (Fareed et al., 2015; Sherer et al., 2016). In England, the National Programme for IT 
(NPfIT) attempted to implement an EHR solution to cover all 50 million citizens (Syal, 2013). In 
Singapore’s national EHR program, the government has involved 280 healthcare institutions and 14,000 
clinicians to support EHR delivery1.  
Achieving healthcare integration through EHR implementation is difficult. England’s efforts 
towards integration through health informatics have had little effect on process and service fragmentation 
(Currie, 2013). Similarly, US efforts from 2007 to 2015 have only yielded 50% of meaningful physician 
EHR use. These difficulties have been attributed to a range of issues including inadequate stakeholder 
engagement (Shirey, 2012), poor communication (Brodbeck, 2012) and misalignment of interests (Jackson 
et al., 2008). Whilst previous studies have attempted to understand these problems (e.g. Yeow and Faraj, 
2011) the organizational perspective taken by many of those (e.g. Hung et al., 2014), does not easily 
translate to the case of regional and national EHRs. The latter involve coordination of multiple stakeholders 
across organizations and regions. 
Achieving healthcare integration calls on vertical consolidation across primary, secondary and 
tertiary care, as well as horizontal integration across health, community and social care. This suggests a 
                                                      
1 http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/health/it-helping-to-address/1362576.html 
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range of stakeholders in development and implementation of EHR, and points to the importance of 
examining the dynamics of their participation. Prior work has looked at the organizational and social 
processes involved in service deployment (Currie & Finnegan, 2009), and the changing roles and 
perceptions of stakeholders in nation-wide HIT implementation (Pouloudi et al., 2016). Building on this 
literature, we further explore the interactions and influences of stakeholders in EHR implementations and 
the manner in which these dynamics shape deployment.  
To provide insights from different national programs we examine two EHR implementations, 
Singapore’s National Electronic Healthcare Record (NEHR) and the NPfIT National Care Records Service 
(NCRS) in England. Other than their clear differences in terms of size, the two countries exhibit both similarities 
and differences in their healthcare structures, systems, and EHR implementations, which enables us to gain a 
better understanding of the target phenomenon. In both countries most tertiary healthcare services are provided 
by public hospitals and thus these were the key stakeholders in EHR implementations. The other important 
stakeholder, primary care, has evolved differently in England and Singapore, England having public 
provision supported by large scale Electronic Patient Records deployment and Singapore having largely 
private provision and mainly paper-based clinical systems.  In both countries, there were coordinating public 
agencies responsible for healthcare assets and national EHR programs, enforcing a “top-down” implementation 
model.  However, despite their similarities, the two programs unfolded differently, drawing in distinct 
stakeholder groups, involving dissimilar dynamics of institutional pressures and stakeholder interactions. 
Thus, these two programs provide us with a valuable opportunity to contrast “top-down” implementations of the 
national EHR programs in different contexts and having varied outcomes.  
 
Motivated thus, we propose the following research question: How do stakeholder interactions shape 
EHR implementation in different national contexts? Specifically, we aim to examine: (a) What are the significant 
stakeholders and groups in EHR implementations in Singapore and England? (b) How do the dynamics of their 
interactions, and pressures they exert and experience play out over time? (c) How do institutional contexts and 
project organization influence those interactions?  To address these questions in our study, we: 1) Identify the 
key stakeholders and analyze their attributes, to better understand how they might shape the implementation of 
EHRs, 2) Examine the dynamics of stakeholders’ interactions over time in realizing EHRs, focusing on 
stakeholder power, interests, institutional pressures, and logics.  
We conducted interpretive case studies using a new analytical framework we derived from 
stakeholder and institutional theory. Stakeholder theory (Mitchell et al., 1997; Freeman, 2010) is relevant 
for our study given complex systems, such as EHR, involve broad, heterogeneous parties (Pouloudi et al., 
2016). It supports identification and analysis of these. Institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) has 
been employed in information systems literature to understand forces affecting technology development, 
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innovation and adoption (Mignerat & Rivard, 2009). It supports our analysis of the evolution of the 
institutional environment and actors’ responses to these changes. Taken together, the two theories inform 
longitudinal examination of EHR implementation in an environment characterized by multiple stakeholders’ 
dynamic interactions.  
The theoretical contribution of this study is through an extension of our understanding of how 
stakeholders, with different attributes and institutional logics interact through exerted and experienced 
pressures in the context of national EHR deployments. Our identification of key stakeholder groupings and 
interactions contributes to research on stakeholders. We also advance the institutional literature by 
identifying the dynamics of pressures amongst stakeholders during implementation. The comparison of the 
two case studies supports better understanding of how these dynamics led to different outcomes. Practically, 
this study should support practitioners in understanding and managing stakeholder dynamics in EHR 
implementations. 
In the following sections we describe stakeholder and institutional theories and the integrative 
framework that we apply to the analysis of the two national EHR implementations. We then compare the two 
programs and present our conclusions, elaborating on the contributions highlighted above. 
2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Institutional Theory and Institutional Logics 
Institutional theory describes the process by which institutional structures, defined as systems of 
embedded social rules and norms (Hodgson, 2006), become established as guidelines for individual and 
organizational action, and how they may evolve or decline over time (Scott, 2005). Healthcare 
organizations, including hospitals and professional bodies, represent institutions which together constitute 
an institutional field (Currie & Guah, 2007). Institutional behaviors emerge from inter-related processes at 
the individual, organization and inter-organizational level (Marchington & Vincent, 2004). For example, at 
the individual level, it is managers’ norms and values that account for institutionalized behaviors. In 
healthcare, doctors represent individual participants in institutionalization. Their behaviors and knowledge 
are shaped by institutions, such as medical schools, which promote professionalization. In turn, doctors’ 
collective struggle for professional autonomy enables them to influence institutional formation and change 
(Oliver, 1991). At an organizational level, organizational structures, shared belief systems and political 
pressures generate institutional structures which influence behaviors. At the inter-organizational level, 
pressures from government, industry alliances and from societal expectations influence actors’ behaviors 
as they seek legitimacy and support (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Institutional theorists have argued that over time, institutional actors, (i.e. organizations) in similar 
environments will show convergence in behaviors as a result of isomorphism (Hawley, 1968). DiMaggio 
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and Powell (1983) suggested that isomorphism arose through the operation of three forms of pressure, 
coercive, mimetic and normative. Coercive pressure is exerted by those entities that have resources the 
institutional actor relies upon, such as the reliance of Singapore’s hospitals on funding from Ministry of 
Health Holdings (MOHH) which creates pressure to adhere to Ministry of Health (MOH) regulation. 
Government regulations and standards are examples of direct and strong pressures, whilst incentives can be 
considered as direct and soft pressures. Cultural expectations can also be viewed as a form of indirect coercive 
pressure. Mimetic pressure refers to institutional actors’ adoption of structures, practices and technologies 
because these are viewed as best practice without questioning their legitimacy and claims (Oliver, 1991). 
Institutions are more likely to exhibit mimetic behavior under conditions of uncertainty, e.g., when faced 
with new technological innovations. In healthcare, adoption of EHR has been inspired by the benefits 
ascribed to EHR at Kaiser Permanente (Chen et al., 2009). Normative pressure emerges primarily from 
professionalization, the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and 
methods of work and to establish a knowledge base that legitimizes occupational autonomy (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). This may include perceptions of how HIT should be introduced. In the case of EHR, where 
systems are viewed as limiting professional autonomy or disrupting legitimized practice, normative 
pressure might be applied to influence EHR development. In England this was manifest in debates, led by 
the physicians union the British Medical Association, over privacy risks posed by EHRs (Campion-Awaad 
et al., 2014; Pouloudi et al., 2016). Normative pressures might also be directed towards members of a 
profession through expectations that standards and practices inculcated in training would be followed. In 
our study we are concerned with coercive, mimetic and normative pressures exerted by varied stakeholders, 
and we examine mimetic behavior at national, organizational and group levels. 
Through these pressures, certain norms, patterns of behavior, and ideas become institutionalized and 
become the principles, or institutional logics, for the field. Institutional logics shape the way institutions are 
organized, roles and identities are defined and performed, and actors behave, e.g., towards a new IT system. 
However, stakeholders have the capacity to reflect upon and modify these logics (Lockett et al., 2012). Different, 
potentially incompatible, institutional logics might co-exist in an organization, creating strategic challenges for 
the organization (Pache & Santos, 2013). Through negotiations and pragmatic collaboration by the involved 
actors, the rivalry of competing institutional logics can be managed or made to ‘work’ without one logic 
eliminating the other and often without eroding the separate identities of key actors (Reay & Hinings, 2009). In 
the healthcare field, several studies have identified two key, co-existing but polarized institutional logics, i.e., 
medical professionalism and managerialism or business-like healthcare (Reay & Hinings, 2009; Scott et al., 
2000; Yeow & Faraj, 2011). The former focuses on clinician’s responsibility for patients and quality of care, 
while the latter on cost-effectiveness of care and customer satisfaction and is often linked to the application of 
market mechanisms to healthcare. Currie and Guah (2007) propose that in UK healthcare, different logics co-
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exist and chart their eras of dominance, from (medical) professionalism, through managerialism to the 
application of market mechanisms, with other logics also present, e.g., business-focused logics of IT suppliers. 
Researchers have suggested that managerialist-driven applications of IS are resisted by the medical 
profession and often fail or are re-interpreted (Currie & Guah, 2007; Doolin 1999). The notion of 
institutional logics allows us to link individual-level analysis of attitudes towards EHRs and responses to 
pressures to belief systems and practices at group and organizational levels.  
Even though institutional theory has largely been used to study isomorphic behaviors of private 
corporations, researchers have argued that the theory is also appropriate for the study of public agencies, such as 
governments, in “national-level isomorphism” (Bromley & Suárez, 2014; Luna-Reyes & Gil-García, 2011). 
Indeed, a number of nation-states and national organizations have developed in structurally similar ways. 
Additionally, states also seek nationwide legitimacy, through use of national norms and principles, such as 
progress and justice. Thus, isomorphism can be seen in national structures and policies. Coercive, isomorphic 
and normative pressures are exerted in and between different types of organizations, both private and public. 
Therefore, we propose that institutional theory is appropriate for investigating implementation of national EHR 
programs, which involve both private and public sector stakeholders.  
2.2 Institutional Theory and HIT Implementation 
In the healthcare domain, institutional theory has been applied to explain the adoption and implementation of 
HIT. Survey-based studies have analyzed isomorphic pressures to adopt HIT on organizational stakeholders 
(e.g., Sherer et al., 2016; Fareed et al., 2015), or individual stakeholders, e.g., clinicians (Klöcker et al., 2014) 
and top management (Gopalakrishna-Remani et al., 2016). Klöcker et al. (2014) found that coerceive and 
mimetic pressures, but not normative pressures from the government or industry, had significant indirect effects 
on clinicians’ decision to resist the introduction of the German Electronic Health Card (eGK). A study of EHR 
implementation in the US found that all three pressures, mediated by the contextual environment, influenced 
hospitals’ adoption of EHR (Sherer et al., 2016). Fareed et al. (2015) examined the impact of factors that could 
make US hospitals comply with institutional pressures to implement EHR. Following Oliver (1991) they 
suggested that organizations may adopt different responses i.e., choose to yield to the institutional pressures, 
to cooperate, challenge, manipulate, or even avoid the institutional environment. 
The findings of these studies are relevant to our research, as we are also interested in the ways that 
stakeholders (such as groups of clinicians) respond to pressures and how their responses may be environmentally 
mediated. Nevertheless, these studies differ significantly from ours. First, they utilize survey instruments, while 
our study uses a qualitative approach that provides more in-depth (though not as generalizable) insights. Second, 
they assess the impact of different kinds of institutional pressures on HIT (e.g., EHR or analytics systems) 
adoption by hospitals or individuals. In contrast, our paper examines the target national EHR implementations 
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holistically by analyzing inter-related institutional pressures as exerted and experienced by key stakeholdes (both 
organizations and individuals involved) and how this could shape the outcomes. 
There are also qualitative studies on the role of institutional pressures in national eHealth programs. 
Klöcker et al.’s (2014) literature review identified 33 case-based studies that used a macro prespective to 
examine countrywide eHealth programs, of which 7 studies explicitly examined the effects of institutional 
factors in those programs. Of these, 4 studies (Currie, 2012; Currie & Guah, 2007; Jensen et al., 2009; Mekonnen 
& Sahay, 2008) were about EHR implementation and, thus, particularly relevant to our work. Klöcker et al. 
(2014) did not find quantitative studies on this topic. A recent review by Sligo et al. (2017) did not reveal any 
additional articles on national eHealth programs from institutional perspective. 
A number of claims emerge from these case studies. For example, Jensen et al. (2009) reported that 
while institutional pressures were normally exerted top-down e.g., from the institutional field onto 
organizations or individual actors, bottom-up processes may also influence HIT implementations. This view 
is re-enforced by Mekonnen and Sahay’s (2008) research on how formal institutions e.g., policies, interact 
with various informal institutions e.g., the existing work practices, resource constraints, and staff capacity, 
in influencing HIT implementations. Currie and Guah (2007) examined the institutional logics and governance 
structures in England’s NHS organizations. They noted that the growing fragmentation of the healthcare field 
and conflicting institutional logics made it difficult to attain agreement on the aims and objectives of NPfIT. In 
another study, Currie (2012) illustrated how coercive pressures i.e., government policy, to impose a standardized, 
shared EHR and to change working practices in England’s NHS, were thwarted by isomorphic structures, 
including established clinical routines, norms and behaviors of clinicians. Specifically, normative pressures 
arising from professionalism (doctors belonging to professional bodies) played an important role in the resistance 
to EHR in the UK context (Currie, 2012).   
In addition to these studies, Azad and King (2012) described how clinicians resorted to workarounds 
to cope with top-down institutional pressures, such as policies and standards and computer systems that 
embedded them, and bottom-up pressures of day-to-day work material constraints that made adherence to 
those policies difficult in practice. In doing so, enacted practices (actual system use) became disconnected 
from the formal policy (design use). While some studies take institutions and institutional fields as their level 
of analysis  (e.g., Scott et al., 2000) others adopt a ‘micro’ focus on actions and practices of actors performing 
‘institutional work’ (Azad & King, 2012; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Yeow & Faraj, 2011). Currie and Guah (2007) 
advocate a multi-level analysis, reflecting on how societal, inter-organisational, and individual (agency) 
factors influence the institutional environment of healthcare. Progressing the above studies, our research 
links different levels of analysis and considers institutional conditions (such as the structure of the 
healthcare field, existing IT infrastructures and project organization), and dynamics of institutional 
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pressures as exerted through and experienced by different stakeholders in national EHR implementations 
in two different countries.   
2.3 Conceptualizing Stakeholders in EHR Implementation 
Key to answering our research questions is the identification of stakeholders and understanding how they 
dynamically exert or experience institutional pressures and hence influence nationwide EHR implementations. 
Drawing on stakeholder theory (Freeman, 2010; Mitchell et al., 1997) and on information systems literature 
theorizing of IS stakeholders (Boonstra and de Vries, 2008; Lamb, 2006; Pouloudi et al., 2016) we conceptualize 
stakeholders in our study as institutional actors (e.g., individuals, groups, and organizations) that affect or are 
affected by EHR deployment and use, and are conditioned by organizational and national contexts. Thus, our 
concept of stakeholder is much broader than ‘IT user’ and includes those stakeholders which might directly or 
indirectly influence policy and strategies of EHR implementation. Stakeholder numbers and types are both 
context and time dependent. Prior research on IT-enabled healthcare integration has identified various 
stakeholders, including patients, physicians, IT suppliers and government bodies (Evans et al., 2013; McLeod Jr 
& Clark, 2009) as well as consultants, pressure and professional groups and media (Pouloudi et al., 2016). 
Stakeholders may have multiple roles, and their perceptions and values may change over time. 
Their actions are often intertwined and influence each other dynamically (e.g., in the way they respond to 
institutional pressures). A stakeholder attribute, defined as a relational attribute, i.e. depending on which 
stakeholder relations we study at what point of time, is useful to understanding the interaction between 
different entities. Particularly, stakeholder attributes are investigated to understand how a stakeholder can 
influence an organization, a project, or any other stakeholders and how it can be influenced. For this purpose, 
Mitchell et al. (1997) suggest focusing on stakeholders’ attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. 
Specifically, they define power as the extent to which an actor can impose its will in a relationship; legitimacy 
is the generalized perception that the actions of the actor are accepted and expected within a socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions; and urgency refers to whether stakeholder’s claims call for 
immediate attention of the organization based on time sensitivity. Among these, power and legitimacy are 
suggested as core attributes for defining dominant stakeholders (Agle et al., 1999; Rawlins, 2006). The IS 
literature illustrates how stakeholders’ power, interests and values, and in particular work ethos, influence their 
perceptions of HIT and their ability to shape related policy and strategies before and during implementation 
(Petrakaki & Klecun, 2015; Pouloudi, 2016). Also, it discusses how they apply discretion when using (or 
refusing to use) such systems (Azad & King 2012; Petrakaki et al., 2016). 
We conceptualize stakeholders’ power as relational, i.e., in relation to their ability to influence 
other actors, as dynamic, having diverse forms and locations, and as being dependent on structural 
relations (Foucault, 1979). Although we eschew an essentialist perspective of power we do not subscribe 
to the view that power resides between actors and cannot be attributed to any particular actor. Thus, we 
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study how different stakeholders may exercise power (through exerting different pressures) drawing on 
resources they command and legitimacy they claim. It is only in this dynamic and relational sense that 
we refer to power as an ‘attribute’ of a stakeholder. But power itself is not sufficient to understand actors’ 
influence, e.g., individuals or organizations with little formal power may draw influence from their 
legitimacy. Whilst urgency is not explicitly discussed in organization theories, it is implicitly included. 
Indeed, the attention-getting capacity of the urgent claim is suggested to be important in the relationship 
between a manager and other stakeholders or between other stakeholders. For example, in the English case 
study, perceived urgency of claims made by different healthcare organizations influenced how they were 
dealt with by the central coordinating agency. 
2.4 An Integrative Framework 
To progress current literature in stakeholder and institutional research on healthcare integration, we apply 
institutional and stakeholder theories as our theoretical lenses to provide insights into the mutual influences 
of multiple institutional actors over time in the nationwide EHR implementations. Particularly, the concepts 
of stakeholder attributes allow us to describe the salience of stakeholders, while institutional theory helps 
identify the dynamic pressures through which these attributes support stakeholders’ mutual influence. Figure 1 
shows our theoretical framework integrating relevant concepts from institutional theory and stakeholder 
identification. In the framework, stakeholder attributes are closely related to the institutional pressures they exert 
or experience. For example, the power attribute of stakeholder salience is related to the coercive pressures the 
stakeholder can exert on its external environment, while legitimacy can explain a stakeholder’s ability to employ 
normative pressures. Additionally, institutional theory, which explicates the evolution over time of the 
institutional environment, provides insights into understanding how this may influence stakeholders’ 
interactions. Different institutional pressures can be inter-related and influence each other to drive the changes 
in the institutional environment. By weaving these theoretical lenses together, we aim to develop a richer 
understanding of complex, multi-stakeholder and long-term HIT implementations, in this case for national EHR 
programs. 
We combine the concepts of institutional pressures with the notion of institutional logics, such as 
professionalism, managerialism and market logics, in order to gain a better understanding of why certain 
innovations (such as EHR) become institutionalized (or not). We employ Townley's (1997) position that 
institutional logic is an important factor influencing responses to isomorphic pressures. We suggest that external 
processes of deinstitutionalization and institutionalization of innovations have to be understood together with 
the internal dynamics of interpretation, adoption, and rejection of the innovation by the individual organization. 
To examine those we focus on stakeholders’ agency, i.e. their capacity to interpret, manipulate and resist 
isomorphic pressures and reflect on and influence institutional logics.  
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Figure 1  Integrative Framework 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Methodological Approach  
Healthcare integration through national EHR programs represents a complex real-life process. We adopted 
an interpretative case study approach as this supports the description of such social phenomena in context 
(Walsham 1993). This allowed our reflection on the nuanced institutional processes at play, and 
stakeholders’ perspectives and saliences. Our analysis was informed by our theoretical framework, which 
was instantiated through our case analysis. To address our research questions we focused on two examples 
of integration programs, Singapore’s National Electronic Health Records (NEHR) program, and the English 
NHS’ Care Records Service (NCRS) as part of the NPfIT program.  
We are interested in those two countries because they adopted broadly similar implementation 
models of EHR (top down, standardized solutions) but experienced significantly different results, 
Singapore’s program being viewed as broadly successful, England’s as a program that faced significant 
challenges (Currie, 2013; Sheikh et al., 2011; Syal, 2013). The two countries differ widely in their political 
and institutional conditions (i.e. size and complexity of the field, including the quantity, heterogeneity and 
autonomy of stakeholders), and existing IT infrastructures, whilst exhibiting both similarities and 
differences in their healthcare model (e.g. private/public split) and governing structures. The examples of 
the two countries allow us to analyze how institutional pressures to adopt EHR dynamically play out (are 
exercised and responded to) under different institutional conditions. 
3.2 Data Collection 
In order to understand the EHR implementation phenomenon and to instantiate our framework, we used primary 
and secondary data (Noor, 2008) for both nations. Primary data was obtained through interviews with key 
personnel from organizations participating in the EHR implementations, and secondary data from public 
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documents, such as policy statements, reports, presentations, and news articles. 
For the Singapore case, our analysis was based on primary data collected during 2013-2015 and from 
secondary data sources produced during 2006-2015. Our primary data consisted of interviews with key 
personnel at the Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Health Holdings (MOHH), Agency of Integrated Care 
(AIC), Integrated Health Information Systems (IHIS) and Acute Public Hospitals (APH), as well as doctors at 
general practitioner (GP) clinics and polyclinics. The sample interviewed consisted of clinicians (20%); 
managers and administrative staff (40%), IT representatives from public agencies responsible for the 
implementation of NEHR (20%), and representatives from private service providers (20%). Secondary data was 
taken from the webpages, presentations, policies and reports of public agencies (e.g., MOH, MOHH), IT 
vendors’ documents, and online news. We conducted 15 semi-structured interviews (face-to-face or by email) 
and analyzed 74 documents from public agencies and other stakeholders, news articles and webpages (see 
Appendix A for details). 
For the English case2, we reviewed policy and strategy papers spanning the period 1998-2016. For the 
NPfIT initiative we drew on data from a large evaluation of NCRS adoption conducted between 2009 and 2011 
(see Appendix C for details). Here, we directly reference the relevant sub-set of the interviews (33 in total) 
conducted by a research team of which one author was a member. This sub-set consisted of clinicians, including 
physicians, nurses and allied health professionals (48%); managers and administrative staff (6%); IT managers 
and specialists (27%); government agency representatives (from the Strategic Health Authority) (6%); EHR 
providers from private sector (12%).  
In Singapore, the preliminary research framework was developed based on stakeholder and institutional 
theories, which guided the subsequent data collection. For the English case, data collection was guided by a 
socio-technical perspective that emphasized concepts of power, identity, stakeholder institutionalization, as well 
as healthcare transformation in relation to IT policy, strategies, design, implementation and use.  
3.3 Data Analysis 
Our cases, Singapore’s NEHR and England’s NCRS were analyzed separately using the methods described 
below, following which the findings were compared across the two cases. We combined top-down, thematic 
coding guided by concepts in our framework of Figure 1 and bottom-up, inductive coding that allowed 
themes to emerge from the data. Examples of thematic coding included specific mechanisms of exerting 
isomorphic and market pressures (e.g., regulations and incentives) that influenced EHR implementation in 
each country, institutional logics present in the organizations involved, stakeholders’ claims to legitimacy, 
and their ability to exercise power. We then searched for relationships in the data (such as dependencies 
between different stakeholders and groups, and sequences/ links between pressures and counter-pressures), 
                                                      
2 To make our scope more tractable we focused on EHR implementation in England and not in the entire UK, as each nation in the 
UK pursued different policy. England is the largest constituent of the UK. 
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and conducted cross-checking of tentative findings within each case (country) and between the countries 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). This was an iterative process as advocated in the literature (Klein & Myers, 
1999). Whilst comparing the data from both countries we focused on stakeholders and groups, institutional 
pressures, logics and dynamics. We also took into consideration institutional conditions, such as national 
context (size, area, and political condition), healthcare provision model, existing IT infrastructure, as well 
as project organization, including funding, delivery of systems and outcomes of the program in terms of 
adoption rates (see Appendix E and Tables 1 and 2 for detailed comparisons).   
Our aim was to “delineate the deep structure and then to integrate the data” (Miles & Huberman, 
1994, p.91), as per our explanatory framework, i.e. to produce plausible explanations of how institutional 
pressures work in different contexts and in relation to particular HIT implementation models. We do not 
claim, however, to prove causal links between discrete variables, and acknowledge that the generalizations 
we do suggest should not be seen as universal laws but rather as insights derived from particular settings 
that may be valuable in other contexts as well (Walsham, 1995). The findings from each country are discussed 
next, followed by a cross-country comparison. 
4.  FINDINGS FROM SINGAPORE 
To address our research questions within the Singapore context, we describe the results of our analysis of primary 
(interviews) and secondary data sources (e.g., public agency reports, news). For details of the data for this case, 
refer to Appendices A and B. In this section, we begin with an introduction to Singapore’s healthcare system 
and then discuss the origins, goals, and institutional processes in relation to our integrative framework for NEHR 
implementation. 
4.1 Overview of Healthcare in Singapore 
Singapore is a developed Asian city state with a population of 5.61 million (DOS, 2016) and has one of the most 
efficient healthcare systems, in terms of life expectancy vs. per-capita healthcare spending (Du & Lu, 2016). In 
Singapore, the Ministry of Health (MOH) is responsible for devising healthcare policies that aim to provide 
accessible, affordable, quality health services. Ministry of Health Holdings (MOHH) is the holding company for 
Singapore’s public health entities (clusters) and assets. MOHH is also the strategic partner of MOH in 
implementing healthcare policy across public healthcare organizations. Primary healthcare in Singapore is 
mainly (i.e., 80%) delivered through private general practitioners (GPs), while 20% is provided through 
government polyclinics3. On the other hand, tertiary hospital services are mainly (80%) provided by public 
hospitals, with the remaining by private hospitals. For patients who require continuing care after discharge from 
the hospitals, there are also Intermediate and Long Term Care (ILTC) organizations, such as community 
hospitals (CHs) and nursing homes (NHs).  
                                                      
3 https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/statistics/healthcare_institutionstatistics.html 
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In 1985, to increase healthcare efficiency, Singapore undertook a program of healthcare privatization. 
This restructuring policy, however, led to “counter-productive” competition, that increased costs, inefficiencies 
and produced data-silos (Okma et al., 2010). To shift competition from between individual institutions to 
between integrated networks, public healthcare was reorganized into two clusters in 2000 (Shum & Lee, 2014), 
i.e., the National Healthcare Group (NHG) and SingHealth. During this process, most hospitals (more than 80% 
hospital beds) were changed to public ownership. After the transformation, public hospitals could enjoy 
operational autonomy and still participate in market competition, but their strategies were under government 
control (Ramesh & Bali, 2018). However, to support its integrated healthcare vision, which aims to facilitate the 
continuity of care for patients, Singapore further reorganized the two clusters into a Regional Healthcare Services 
(RHS) framework in 2010 (Shum & Lee, 2014). The framework encompasses six clusters spread across the 
island (“regions”), each offering comprehensive healthcare (from primary to long term care)4. Each region is 
anchored by an acute public hospital (APH) that works closely with other healthcare organizations (i.e., 
community hospitals, nursing homes, GP clinics, and polyclinics) in the region, government agencies (e.g., 
MOH, MOHH, IHIS, AIC), and volunteers, with participants from both public and private sectors. The RHS 
model intended that patients need not travel outside their region to seek medical services. To support this 
integrated care vision, staff members from IT departments of all healthcare clusters were brought together to 
form the Integrated Healthcare Information Systems (IHIS) body in 2008. IHIS aims to create a strengthened 
and consolidated IT workforce to empower Regional Healthcare Services 5 . In addition, the Agency for 
Integrated Care (AIC) was formed in 2009 to link primary care and Intermediate and Long Term Care through 
each cluster’s Acute Public Hospital.6 AIC’s aim was to link primary, secondary, and tertiary care for each 
patient. Critical to Singapore’s integrated care vision is the National Electronic Health Record (NEHR), which 
origins, goals and adoption we describe in the following section. 
4.2 Origins and Goals of NEHR 
Two clusters in the public healthcare division, i.e., NHG and SingHealth, were created in 2000 characterized by 
horizontal and vertical integration (Shum & Lee, 2014), bringing together assets across the healthcare spectrum 
ranging from polyclinics in primary care, to the acute hospitals and specialist centers of secondary and tertiary 
care (Mok & Forrest, 2008). As a result, each cluster developed their own IT systems (Okma et al., 2010; Sinha 
et al., 2013). The NHG cluster’s electronic medical record (EMR7) system called CPSS (Computerized Patient 
Support System) was self-built by IHIS, while the SingHealth cluster’s system was a commercial product 
(Eclipsys). This led to “fragmented and relatively uncoordinated healthcare services” (IDA, 2006) across the 
                                                      
4 Subsequent to our study, the RHS framework had further changes. As announced in Jan 2017, Singapore’s public healthcare 
system would be reorganized from 6 clusters to 3 integrated clusters. The reorganization has been completed in early 2018.   
5 https://www.ihis.com.sg/About_IHiS/Pages/milestones.aspx 
6 https://www.aic.sg/about-us/more-about-aic 
7 EMR refers to the digital version of erstwhile patient paper records in a single healthcare organization, while EHR are designed 
to share patient records beyond single health organizations that collect and compile patient information. 
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two clusters within Singapore’s healthcare systems. Moreover, since the two clusters did not include healthcare 
services from private healthcare providers, who are responsible for 80% of Singapore’s primary healthcare 
services8, achieving continuity of patient care was challenging (Shum & Lee, 2014). Furthermore, at that time, 
primary care providers, such as GPs, did not possess EHRs or EMRs.  
Through reviewing the clustering experience, MOH progressively refined the healthcare delivery model 
to promote integrated healthcare in Singapore. This led to the reorganization of clusters and the establishment of 
the Regional Health Services (RHS) framework and Regional Health Systems, with the aim to facilitate close 
partnerships and collaboration beyond the public health institutions, and include private healthcare providers and 
voluntary welfare organizations into the efforts in patient-level care (Shum & Lee, 2014). Prior to NEHR, the 
Electronic Medical Records Exchange (EMRX) was implemented in 2004 for secure cross-cluster exchange of 
patient information. However, EMRX had a major drawback, as it was essentially a document-level exchange, 
with no standardized or structured data.  Seamless sharing of data beyond documents was impossible, e.g., 
diagnostic images, including X-rays, could not be exchanged over EMRX9. 
Thus, to support seamless data transmission across care organizations under a “One Patient – One 
Record” vision NEHR’s objective was to create one care record for each patient over time by consolidating all 
relevant healthcare information through secure inter-organization information sharing (Kwee, 2009). NEHR was 
envisaged as a single, provider agnostic EHR system with a central database. It was intended for use by all public 
and private healthcare providers (Muttitt et al., 2012).  
The NEHR project officially received funding in 2009 (Hodge, 2011), although preliminary 
explorations began in 2008 (Muttitt, 2008). For the NEHR design and implementation, MOH instructed MOHH 
to carry out the NEHR project and deliver the systems on its behalf. IHIS worked with the IT teams from MOHH 
in the integration of different IT systems and NEHR. Furthermore, commercial solution providers were 
introduced through contracts, i.e., an Accenture-led consortium was responsible for developing the NEHR 
systems and infrastructure, and also with integrating legacy systems into NEHR. 
4.3 Institutional Logics and Processes 
The stakeholders in the NEHR project ranged from organizations to individuals. Specifically, at the organization 
level, there were acute public hospitals (APHs), which were at the center of each RHS cluster; other healthcare 
providers in each cluster, i.e., community hospitals (CHs), polyclinics, GP clinics, and nursing homes (NH); the 
public sector organizations guiding or implementing NEHR program, i.e., Ministry of Health Holdings (MOHH), 
Ministry of Health (MOH) and Integrated Health Information Systems (IHIS); and a commercial NEHR 
consortium of vendors led by Accenture. Individual stakeholders included Chief medical information officers 
                                                      
8 https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/statistics/healthcare_institutionstatistics.html 
9 https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/pressRoom/Parliamentary_QA/2010/Update_on_the_National_Electronic_He
alth_Records_System.html 
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(CMIO), healthcare professionals (e.g., doctors), and administrators. Figure 2 depicts the organizational 
stakeholders and the institutional processes of NEHR implementation, discussed in detail next (all evidence 
summarized in Appendix B). 
 Having greater power than MOHH, MOH sought to use its authority and resources to assign MOHH 
(coercive pressure 1. CP) the task of carrying out the NEHR project on its behalf. In the process, power 
transference took place and MOHH drove the NEHR project. A MOHH senior manager revealed that NEHR 
was “planned, designed, and managed, top-down from here (MOHH)”. Moreover, MOHH was able to draw on 
its ownership of all public healthcare assets, including public healthcare providers (e.g., APHs), manpower and 
funding to influence the implementation of NEHR project. Thus, it now had power and legitimacy over other 
stakeholders.  
When designing and implementing the NEHR project, MOHH was influenced by mimetic pressure (2A. 
MP) based on the similarities of Singapore’s MOHH and Canada’s Health Infoway organization in governing 
EHR projects (Muttitt, 2008). This was facilitated by bringing in overseas consultants (e.g., Dr. Sarah Muttitt, 
 
Figure 2  The Institutional Processes of NEHR 
Note: NP=normative pressure, CP=coercive pressure, MP=mimetic pressure 
Numbers next to these letters (e.g., 1.NP) are indicative of the chronological order of pressures observed, but it 
should be noted that many pressures were continuous or iterative. Same numbers (e.g., 2A and 2B) indicate 
concurrence. 
APH=acute public hospital, CH=community hospital, CMIO=chief medical information officer, GP=general 
practitioner, IHIS=Integrated Health Information Systems, MOHH=Ministry of Health Holdings, MOH=Ministry 
of Health,  NH=nursing home  
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from Canada Health Infoway was recruited as MOHH CIO in 2007) into the MOHH NEHR leadership team. 
MOHH’s Information System Division adapted the proposed NEHR solution based on Canada Infoway’s EHR 
experiences. These consultants worked as the employees of MOHH and exerted normative influences (2B. NP) 
based on their past EHR experiences from other countries and professional bodies within MOHH. Coupled with 
the above mimetic pressure (2A. MP), this normative pressure further aided the “travel of ideas” as experiences 
from Canada’s Infoway EHR were incorporated into the NEHR design.  
Other normative pressures (3A. NP) on MOHH during the design of NEHR stemmed from the 
formation of a steering committee (Clinical Advisory Group) comprising of 5 different taskforces (Data 
stewardship, Summary care record, Computerized provider order entry & medication management, Secondary 
data-use, Diagnostics) that looked after various NEHR clinical informatics aspects alongside the governance 
aspects (Brooks, 2010). This allowed for stakeholders comprising of different institutional logics to be 
represented, ranging from managers encompassing market or managerialism logics to doctors abiding by their 
professionalism. The steering committee (with 5 taskforces) structure was an attempt to manage the competing 
institutional logics, so as to ensure that the interests of all stakeholders were balanced and represented. 
Additionally, the IT Manager of one of the APHs noted that their Chief Medical Information Officer (CMIO) 
played a “pivotal role by providing critical clinical directions and inputs”. This reflects the CMIOs’ normative 
influence (3B. NP) which was integral throughout the process because of their ability to relate IT with their 
professional interests (as doctors). This allowed for accurate requirements to be gathered so that NEHR remained 
clinically relevant for doctors. Another normative pressure (3C. NP) came from IHIS that provided “knowledge 
about the ground operations for the NEHR team” [IHIS Senior Manager 2] to MOHH. 
As a subsidiary of MOHH, the Integrated Health Information Systems (IHIS) agency also experienced 
coercive pressure (3D.CP) from MOHH to integrate different systems with NEHR. For example, it worked with 
MOHH to standardize data from the different EMR systems of SingHealth and National Healthcare Group for 
integration with NEHR. IHIS standardized, extracted, transformed, loaded and did “a lot of mapping” of the 
relevant data. Furthermore, originally formed by the IT staff members from healthcare clusters, IHIS employees 
worked closely with the healthcare workers in the hospitals, IHIS was influenced by the normative pressures 
(3E.NP) from doctors and took consideration of their professional needs.  
In addition to IHIS, the Accenture-led NEHR consortium was an important system integrator. It was 
stated they also “do the infrastructure and development of NEHR system” [IHIS senior manager]. MOHH 
exerted coercive pressure (4.CP) on this consortium through awarding contracts. The consortium then worked 
with MOHH during the design of NEHR through exerting normative pressure (5A.NP). In order to better 
understand their professional needs, Accenture engaged doctors from hospitals and analyzed their requirements, 
during which time the hospitals exerted normative pressures on the consortium (5B.NP). 
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To create exemplar organizations of NEHR implementation in the healthcare system, and populate the 
initial database for NEHR, MOHH first delivered NEHR to the Acute Public Hospitals (APHs) in the two 
clusters through application of coercive pressure (6A. CP).  MOHH attempted to co-opt the public APHs first, 
rather than private healthcare providers for two reasons. First, MOHH held the public ownership of APHs and 
had the power to directly control the behavior of APHs. It was noted by the senior manager, “when the instruction 
or the policy directions have been made at the government level… you’re (public healthcare institutions) with 
it”. The other reason is that APHs held high legitimacy in NEHR effort by serving as anchors for each RHS and 
contributing more than 90% of the population’s healthcare data [MOHH senior clinician]. The coercive pressure 
(6A. CP) was further facilitated by the resources of MOHH.  A MOHH IT manager mentioned, “NEHR is … 
free to the provider… and funded by a capital grant from the government”. At the same time, to ensure that there 
were appropriate mechanisms governing the security and jurisdictions of the shared data, MOH exerted coercive 
pressure (6B. CP) over APHs through enacting policies, such as the Data Protection Policy (EHA, 2014; 
SingHealth, 2014).   
In turn, MOHH was subject to normative pressures (7A.NP) from hospital doctors in two ways. First, 
feedback on NEHR was sought from doctors within APHs. An APH senior clinician explained, “every time they 
(MOHH) launch one version they make us (doctors) test it”. Doctors gave feedback to MOHH on existing 
processes such as the NEHR registration method. As noted by an APH senior clinician, “a lot of people didn’t 
bother to register… we basically told them (MOHH) no one was going to use it (NEHR)”. Second, when the 
EMRX system was to be deprecated in order to make way for NEHR, doctors resisted such a change, telling 
MOHH, “you cannot shutdown the EMRX” [MOHH Senior Manager] because they had become well acquainted 
with the system.  
Throughout this process, APHs’ Chief Medical Information Officers (CMIOs) played an essential role 
in increasing NEHR adoption and improving its design to meet doctors’ requirements. They exerted normative 
pressures both within (7C.NP) and outside (7B.NP) their APH. Internally, within hospitals, because of their 
position, an IHIS Senior Manager noted that CMIOs had the “authority to convince their fellow colleagues”. As 
a result, they were appointed as “change champions” [APH Senior Clinician] to increase NEHR adoption 
amongst fellow doctors through normative pressure (7C.NP). Externally to MOHH, an IHIS senior manager 
noted, “they (CMIOs) are very involved… right down to how things are displayed on screens” (7B.NP). Aiming 
to incorporate medical professionalism into managerialism, CMIOs helped alleviate the conflicts between the 
institutional logics of APHs and that of MOHH managers. Specifically, the CMIOs and doctors in the APHs 
mainly subscribed to professionalism logics, while MOHH managers followed mainly managerialism or 
market logics.  
After achieving success with implementing NEHR among APHs, from 2012, MOHH began to involve 
the rest of the public and private healthcare organizations. For example, since community hospitals (CHs) and 
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polyclinics wee under the purview of APHs’ healthcare systems, MOHH directly exerted coercive pressures 
(8A&8B. CP) on them. Specifically, CHs adopted the same system with their own cluster APHs while all the 
polyclinics adopted the same system. Particularly, under the RHS framework, CHs needed to be tightly 
integrated with APHs in order to provide step-down care for patients who have just been discharged from APHs. 
This ensured continuity of care and eased APH’s high bed-occupancy rate, reflecting CHs’ urgency and 
legitimacy in NEHR access.  
On the other hand, as involvement of private healthcare organizations (e.g., GP clinics and some NHs) 
in NEHR was not under MOHH’s direct control, a “soft approach” was applied as mentioned by a MOHH 
Senior Clinician through its leverage of subsidies, incentives, and IT enablement schemes. First, MOHH offset 
NEHR costs to alleviate the concerns from those providers, who espoused the market logic and “were very 
worried about (NEHR) costs”. As most of them lacked IT capability and legacy systems, MOHH took the 
opportunity to pursue concurrent IT enablement programs for GP clinics (i.e., CLEO10 - Clinic EMR and 
Operation system) and NHs (i.e., NHELP11 - Nursing Home IT Enablement Program). Particularly, MOHH 
sought to leverage funding programs to exert coercive pressure on GP clinics (8C.CP) and NHs (8D.CP), and 
thereby promoted the adoption of the IT-enabled programs for NEHR access indirectly. 
For example, as 80% of Singapore’s population uses private GP clinics for primary care12 and some of 
them are eligible for government healthcare funding schemes, GP clinics were enticed to implement a capable 
IT setup (e.g., through the CLEO program) and submit claims via accessing a (web) portal for them to log into 
to get information from the NEHR. As a MOHH senior manager rationalized, “sooner or later… if you want 
these patients, then you have to do this (be IT-enabled and use NEHR)”. Rapid adoption of NEHR by GPs can 
also be explained by the mimetic pressures (9.MP) from other GP clinics in response to uncertainties stemming 
from a changing model of care and the formation of RHS. To create momentum, a MOHH senior manager 
commented that a pioneer group of GPs was chosen as a model to other GPs. These pioneers were described as 
“very progressive people who were ready to go”, e.g., those who embodied professionalism logic (as observed 
by a GP, “from my perspective, patient care comes first, and we aim to do that and then if they can pay us, 
good”). Similarly, in order to entice Nursing Homes (NHs) to implement the NHELP, MOHH offered “NHELP 
free to nursing homes for three years (Lee, 2014). They also mentioned attempts at creating mimetic pressures 
(10.MP) on nursing homes. An APH senior manager noted that in order to get more nursing homes on board 
NHELP, they planned to “bring along the nursing homes who have already adopted NEHR to come and share 
with them (potential NEHR adoption nursing homes) the usefulness… easier to get one of the champion to sell”.  
 By June 2013, NEHR has been implemented in all public hospitals, all polyclinics, as well as some 
                                                      
10 https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/pressRoom/speeches_d/2011/closing_address_bymsyongying-ipermanentsec-
retaryhealthatthenatio.html 
11 https://www.ihis.com.sg/Project_Showcase/Healthcare_Systems/Pages/NHELP.aspx 
12 https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/statistics/healthcare_institutionstatistics.html 
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Community Hospitals (CHs), NHs, and GP clinics – as per the targets of its first phase. Since then MOH 
has actively encouraged private healthcare providers not yet on board to adopt NEHR13. As Singapore’s 
healthcare system adapts to fulfill changing health needs, NEHR is also evolving. MOH has developed a Health 
IT Master Plan (HITMAP)14, with relevant public and private sector stakeholders to guide IT-enabled healthcare 
integration efforts forward, including NEHR.   
5. FINDINGS FROM ENGLAND 
To address our research questions for the English context, we describe results from our analysis of primary and 
secondary data sources (Appendices C & D provide details of the data for this case). We begin this section with 
an introduction to England’s healthcare system and then discuss the origins, goals, and institutional processes in 
relation to our integrative framework for the National Programme for IT (NPfIT) National Care Records Service 
(NCRS).  
5.1 Overview of Healthcare in England 
Public health provision is managed by National Health Services for each of the UK’s constituent nations. Each 
service adheres to the principle of a tax-funded socialized healthcare system providing most services free at the 
point of delivery. The National Health Service (NHS) in England, hereafter simply the NHS, procured healthcare 
services for 53.1 million citizens in 2011 (Office for National Statistics, 2011). Over the last 70 years, the NHS 
has seen considerable institutional change. Although the Department of Health (DH) continued to be responsible 
for the funding, direction and organizational transformation of health and social care, the underlying structure 
has changed. When NPfIT launched in 2002, there was political consensus around separating the functions of 
healthcare commissioning and healthcare provision (NHS Community & Care Act (1990)). The NHS at this 
time was divided into regional Primary Care Trusts (PCTs)15, responsible for commissioning services from 
acute, mental health, and community health trusts (DH, 1997). In 2003, these were joined by Foundation Trusts 
(FTs), semi-autonomous healthcare providers. Over the period of NPfIT, oversight of NHS trust performance 
was managed by regional Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs), which would also take responsibility for 
promoting health informatics use (Talbot-Smith & Pollock, 2006).   
5.2 Origins and Goals of the NPfIT 
Since 1998, English healthcare policy has promoted EHRs as a support for integrated care by providing access 
to up to date patient health information from healthcare providers (Klecun, 2016). This vision has historically 
been hampered by the proliferation of incompatible software and a lack of agreed standards for data sharing. In 
                                                      
13 https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/pressRoom/pressRoomItemRelease/2013/speech-by-minister-for-health--mr-
gan-kim-yong--at-the-opening-c.html 
14  https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/dam/moh_web/healthscope/archive/2012/MOH%20Healthscope_July-August%202012%20-
Issue.pdf 
15 The NHS organizations such as primary care practices, hospitals, mental health and ambulance services are grouped into trusts. 
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the early 2000s, technological silos predominated in the NHS at inter- and intra-organizational levels, the 
majority of information stored on paper (Brennan, 2005). Primary care was the only sector where 
computerization efforts proved successful. Coercive and normative pressures, including subsidies for IT 
adoption and contractual reporting requirements, led to high rates of GP practice computerization (Benson, 
2002). However, these systems were stand alone. The influential Wanless report (2002) on the future of the 
NHS recognized these challenges and called for a doubling of IT investment. 
Against this background, England’s NPfIT launched in 2002. NPfIT was built on a strictly enforced 
top-down large-scale implementation model following an ethos of ‘ruthless standardization’ (DH, 2002). A new 
National Care Records Service (NCRS) was proposed as part of NPfIT. This would provide a centrally-shared 
patient record expected to improve diagnosis and safety through, for example, a shared record of patient allergies, 
inter-professional collaboration, and more recently, data-sharing for research. NCRS comprised two projects, a 
nationally accessible summary care record (SCR) of emergency information for each citizen, and locally-stored 
detailed care records, the Care Records Service (CRS) that could potentially be shared between different 
providers. Record sharing was supported through a new National Network for the NHS (N3) and a set of 
centralized services (the Spine). These services also enabled additional applications, such as electronic referrals 
and prescriptions, and digital image transmission; services built to standards that enabled data sharing across the 
NHS.  
NPfIT goals were isomorphic not only aiming to implement standardized software (offered without 
charge to NHS contractors and providers), but also to standardize clinical practice through embedding in the 
software ‘best practices’, such as clinical pathways and protocols, and supporting the use of standardized 
clinical codes. This proved problematic from the start, given the NHS is both a highly diverse environment 
with varied local service providers and a strongly institutionalised one, “… there is nobody at the top saying 
you will do this like this, everybody wants to do it their own way…we’re basically made up of hundreds 
and hundreds of organisations that hate each other and will not talk to each other, will not play ball together 
[IT Manager, Site 4]. The independent origins of many NHS organizations led to a “level of variability 
across the trust [that is] staggering. I was amazed how different everything is, everything is different, 
hospital to hospital, right down to simple things like the color of labels on the blood bottles for the different 
sciences [LSP Manager 1]. This level of heterogeneity is also present in the IT systems, where “each 
hospital […] is a completely discrete island of mostly paper but some electronic data”.  [LSP Manager 2]  
5.3 Institutional Logics and Processes 
From government agencies, to healthcare professionals, to the general public, many groups had a ‘stake’ in 
NPfIT. Its governance included oversight from a ministerial taskforce and a Department of Health (DH) 
Director, who reported to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health, the NHS Chief Executive, and 
the Permanent Secretary at DH. The Program Director had day-to-day responsibility for running the program 
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and managing funds. The NHS Information Authority (IA) was initially involved in program delivery until 2005 
when DH disbanded it and set up Connecting for Health (CfH). CfH took charge of development and delivery 
of NPfIT, including setting the new system specifications. Additionally, SHAs took responsibility for promoting 
HIT, including NPfIT solutions. 
The stakeholders in NCRS implementation also included various healthcare providers, from primary 
(GPs), secondary and tertiary healthcare organizations. Within these organizations, there existed several 
stakeholder groups. Broadly, these included hospital management, clinical and other groups. Outside of the 
healthcare organizations and government bodies, there were consulting and IT companies, professional bodies, 
and patient groups as well as media that were involved or interested in NCRS implementation. Figure 3 depicts 
the main stakeholders and the institutional processes of NCRS implementation (evidence provided in Appendix 
D), which are elaborated next.  
 
Figure 3 The Institutional Processes of NPfIT 
Note: NP=normative pressure, CP=coercive pressure, MP=mimetic pressure 
Numbers next to these letters (e.g., 1.NP) are indicative of the chronological order of pressures observed, but it 
should be noted that many pressures were continuous or iterative. Same numbers (e.g., 2A and 2B) indicate 
concurrence. 
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 DH exercised coercive pressure (1a.CP) on the NHS IA/CfH through legislation, policies, regulations, 
contracts and appointments, and normative pressure (1b.NP) on professional bodies by publicizing benefits of 
shared EHR for patient care.  
To deliver NPfIT’s vision, England was split into four regions for service deployment. Despite this, the 
scope and complexity of proposed systems meant only very large organizations with substantial resources could 
bid for contracts. These contracts were awarded to four main ‘solution providers’ (Accenture, British Telecom, 
CSC, and Fujitsu), referred to in subsequent literature as Local Service Providers (LSPs). Formal delivery 
contracts were signed between DH and LSPs, which created obligations for LSPs (coercive pressure 2A.CP) 
and secondary/tertiary healthcare organizations (coercive pressure 2B.CP) in relation to systems’ delivery and 
adoption. As a healthcare professional explained: “the reason why we implemented (NCRS) was because of 
tremendous government pressure for us to go live. If we didn’t have that pressure, we probably would not 
have gone live” [Clinical lead, Site 2]. CfH managed the contract and was thus able to exert coercive pressure 
on LSPs (3A.CP) and secondary/tertiary healthcare organizations (3B.CP). Via contracts, legitimacy and 
(contested) power to deliver standardized software was transferred to LSPs. 
However, LSPs felt the contracts were very constraining and punitive, and as one interviewee noted, “they [the 
LSP] were not in a position to stand up to CfH”. The contract, initially hailed as a great achievement for the 
NHS, shifting risk from the NHS to the suppliers, is now widely considered as being at the root of many problems 
with the program. This is, at least partly because “that contract was not written by the NHS, it’s not managed 
by the NHS it’s managed by this organization called Connecting for Health and it’s only loosely connected 
to what the NHS actually need or want”. [LSP Manager] As the IT Manager in Site 1 explained: “The 
milestones in the plan were set as a contractual milestone so we weren’t allowed to alter those. What was 
quite difficult was we had to work backwards from those milestones … that were probably going to be 
unachievable, but we had to work within the constraints of that contract”. LSPs also exerted coercive 
pressures on DH (4A.CP) and CfH (4B.CP) through contract re-negotiations and legal challenges; Fujitsu 
initiated a successful legal battle when its contract was terminated. LSPs contracted out many aspects of NCRS 
implementation (design, coding and deployment) to software companies, exerting on them coercive pressures 
(5.CP) to deliver systems. Two different approaches to NCRS implementation were adopted: (1) iSoft’s 
attempted development of bespoke software for the NHS, called Lorenzo, and (2) CSC’s customization of an 
established, large-scale packaged American product, Cerner’s Millennium. 
Incentive mechanisms, such as a CfH administered Deployment Incentive Fund (DIF) of £1 million to 
each early adopter organization, helped recruit initial sites. Trusts which chose early adoption were also 
motivated by the desire to raise the power and urgency of their claims and more specifically to “get the biggest 
DH - Department of Health; GPs - General Practices; LSP - Local Service Providers; NHS IA/CfH - NHS 
Information Authority and later NHS Connecting for Health; SHAs - Strategic Health Authorities 
 Dynamics of pressures in national EHR implementations 
  
  24 
impact on designing the things that work and don’t work” [Clinical Lead, Site 3]. They also sought to increase 
their legitimacy as leading organizations. Program leadership hoped isomorphic (mimetic) pressures (6.MP) 
would lead to all sites implementing NCRS following the lead of early adopter sites. According to our 
interviewee “a platform was created to learn from the places that got it wrong and the places that got it 
right and to sort of use that as a vehicle for securing trouble free deployment through the rest of the 
program. [IT Manager, Site 2] However, as initial sites struggled to implement (struggles eagerly reported by 
the media) exchanges of experiences, according to Healthcare Professional, Site 1, were suppressed “Once we 
had gone live with us then I thought, it’s part of my job now as a part of the NHS community to make sure 
other hospitals don’t suffer. I wasn’t allowed to tell other hospitals how bad it was”.   
Furthermore, some interviewees believed the decision to become an early adopter was made by the 
regional administrative bodies, the Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs), rather than the hospitals: “our SHA 
chose two sites to be the first adopters of Cerner … From the trust perspective it felt very much it was decision 
outside of their control” [IT Manager, Site 1]; “there was almost no choice in taking on the system” [Healthcare 
Professional, Site 2]. This indicates the existence of coercive pressure of SHA on hospitals which lacked semi-
autonomous status (given to foundation trusts (FT)) (7.CP).  
Software providers’ contractual arrangements were with the Local Service Providers (LSPs), not the 
trusts receiving NCRS, the LSPs themselves were contracted by DH. Thus, trusts had little formal power in 
terms of contractual arrangements and it was difficult for them to exert direct influence on software providers. 
Clinicians felt they had limited influence over service design, and experienced coercive pressures (8.CP) from 
hospital administration to adopt NCRS, as a nurse explained: “I think people have used it because they’ve had 
to and it’s been, you know, it’s a directive from the trust, and it’s quite clear that that’s what we have to 
do” [Healthcare Professional, Site 5]. During SHA led consultations, clinicians tried to exert coercive (9A.CP) 
and normative (9B.NP) pressures on their organizations (trusts’ management). A SHA manager complained 
that “doctors have control to a large extent over what goes on in the trust and they are very powerful and 
they like to do it their way”. Clinicians and other stakeholder groups in sites implementing the de-novo Lorenzo 
had more scope for software customization. Sites regularly received new system builds and had to test them 
extensively, raising any issues they wanted addressed.  
Both CfH and the LSPs exercised their power to prioritize issues healthcare organizations raised or even 
to reject them on the grounds that software met design specification. LSPs tried to limit customization by 
encouraging (or pressurizing) standardized site practices. Some LSPs facilitated meetings between trusts hoping 
‘ruthless standardization’ could be achieved bottom up (through mimetic pressure 6.MP). However, growing 
problems, led LSPs and CfH to exert coercive pressure (10A.CP & 10B.CP) on both hospital managers and 
clinicians to get them to sign off software even if it was sub-optimal. A Healthcare Professional in Site 2 
bemoaned: “We are being pressured into accepting suboptimal things and they [software developers] are 
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being pressured to develop and deliver suboptimal products just because of the type pressure that they are 
under.”  
Clinicians in turn exercised their power over the process by invoking safety concerns (coercive 
pressures on CFH, SHA, LSP and Software companies – 11A.CP, 11B.CP, 11C.CP and 11D.CP) in order to 
postpone or abandon implementation. One software developer suggested: “the trusts always have the supplier 
over a barrel”. However, trusts’ power and urgency of claims varied over time and depended on unfolding 
events. An interviewee suggested that once a trust signed off the system, system providers would concentrate 
their efforts on the next implementation site, and ignore their needs. “Where you were in the plan determined 
how quickly you got out to supplier resources and that was definitely obvious. That is the downside of the 
National Programme, isn’t it? They will always put the focus on the early sites.” [IT Manager, Site 1]. 
Clinicians’ requests, it appeared, in comparison with other hospital employees, were seen as (relatively) urgent, 
given their perceived power in NCRS implementation. Administrative staff had less power to directly oppose or 
ignore the system but could exercise it indirectly, e.g., by taking sick leave. 
Stakeholders sometimes had more than one role, e.g., a nurse could receive additional system training 
to become a ‘super-user’ (effectively a trainer or a support person), helping others to learn the system. In some 
sites, super-users took active roles in implementation. Some senior clinicians were appointed as national clinical 
leads, the core of a network of people who could communicate the NPfIT vision and present its products to 
frontline NHS staff. In creating clinical leads and super-users the governing agencies attempted to legitimize 
implementation efforts to clinicians. Such professionals, through their role as mediators between the system and 
the users, gained power and urgency. They could also become a source of normative pressures (12.NP) 
exercised on other medical staff. Many clinicians, however, felt these clinical engagement efforts were 
superficial, given their exclusion from decision-making at the start of the program when decisions were being 
made about the nature and functions of the records, locus of control and implementation strategies. “They needed 
to come down a few layers and get people working with the clinicians from day one” [Healthcare 
Professional, Site 1]. 
Relations between stakeholders were characterized by complex inter-dependencies, tensions and 
conflicting expectations. Healthcare staff reflections suggested problems arose from the conflict between the 
market logic of private companies implementing systems and medical professionalism logic. LSPs were 
perceived as focused on product delivery and “not really caring about the product itself”. Some felt LSPs 
politically prioritized support for sites seen as important (e.g., due to exposure in the media). However, LSPs 
and software companies felt they were working under extremely tough contracts to deliver the “mother of all 
systems” (as expressed by one of the interviewees from an LSP). The interviewee described his organization as 
“an engineering company. So we are fundamentally about getting stuff working, delivering it”. Whilst 
acknowledging some positive aspects of CfH leadership, the interviewee complained that CfH “have got a very 
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different mindset, you know, there are fundamentally different, we are fundamentally about delivery, and 
Connecting for Health […] are about negotiating contracts”. This illustrates that different institutional logics 
co-existed with market and medical professionalism logics. We label those engineering logic (exhibited by some 
software providers) and bureaucratic / administrative logic (of CfH). EHR development was perceived as 
highly institutionalized by different stakeholders: “…it takes much longer to do anything than you think it’s 
going to take and there’s so many people involved, so many committees involved to get anything done at 
the supply side” [IT Manager, Site 4] “Everything has to be specified, everything has to be written down, 
when it comes back it has to be multiply tested, it has to be fitted into a framework, it has to be assessed 
against every other national service, I’m surprised they get anything to be honest.”  [Software Developer, 
Software Company]. 
Over the program’s life, stakeholders’ attributes, positions, and attitudes evolved. Although some 
accepted the system and were getting used to it, the majority struggled. Professional organizations (e.g., the 
British Medical Association (BMA) and Royal Colleges), became a source of mimetic pressure (13.MP) on 
clinicians (by amplifying dissatisfaction within the community) and normative pressure (14.NP) on clinicians 
(by issuing statements advising them to oppose NCRS implementation). Thus, mimetic pressures rather than 
supporting NCRS deployment worked against it. With time, professional bodies, patient groups, and the media 
exercised coercive pressure (15-17.CP) on DH to abandon NPfIT, sometimes citing security and privacy 
concerns. Constant media criticism of the program affected other stakeholders too, including software 
developers: because a lot of things aren’t in our direct control a lot of the bad press if you like impacts us 
quite heavily yet it’s not in our gift if you like to do a huge amount about it. [Software Developer, Software 
Company]. Many hospitals delayed their implementation of NCRS. Interestingly, in general, over the program’s 
duration there was a high level of support for the idea of EHRs, but less for this instantiation. 
In the case of primary care, where GP practices, independent contractors to the NHS, had freedom over 
system choice, a plan for a single strategic GP solution was abandoned following GP representations (coercive 
pressure 18.CP). CfH allowed GP practices to procure systems that met a set of minimum requirements. 
Meanwhile, the CfH underwent a series of organizational and leadership changes over its existence. Its 
legitimacy and powers were curtailed in 2007 when responsibility for local delivery of the program transferred 
to SHAs, although CfH retained overall responsibility for implementation activities. However, this new 
approach, called National Local Ownership, did not solve existing problems but introduced new ones. Local 
decision making was not achieved as individual trusts were under SHA leadership. Furthermore, rather than 
dealing with one organization (CfH), LSPs had to deal with several SHAs, who had the power to sign off systems 
(coercive pressure 19.CP), as explained by a LSP Manager: “Our life is much harder since the SHAs came 
along. […]  So if we produce a design deliverable for something originally Connecting for Health would 
have approved that, so there would be one place, they would approve it on behalf of all of the NHS in our 
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cluster. We now have six discreet SHAs, each of whom want to approve it”. After increasingly critical reports 
from the National Audit Office (NAO 2006; 2008; 2011) a formal process for dismantling NPfIT was announced 
in September 2011 when a new Coalition Government came to power. Costs and benefits of NPfIT are difficult 
to pinpoint and depend on what is included. In 2013, the Department of Health forecast total costs of £9.8 billion 
and benefits of £10.7 billion. However, as of 2012, 98% of estimated benefits were still to be realized and it is 
uncertain if they will, whilst contract costs may rise (NAO, 2013). 
Our research indicates considerable inter-site variation in NCRS implementation and its influence on 
work practices. Of 377 sites in which NCRS implementation was expected by the end of 2010, only 78 had 
begun the process of implementing the systems. Even then, most implementations have been of patient 
administration systems with limited clinical functionalities. Despite this, we argue that NPfIT should not be seen 
as a total failure, as a national IT infrastructure has been delivered and many of the programs that formed part of 
this service, including the Electronic Prescription Service (EPS) and SCR remain today, or have been updated. 
These exploit the large installed base of primary care computer systems, coupled with services provided by NHS 
N3 network and the Spine. Isomorphic pressures resulted in some standardization of practices. Part of the 
installed base that supported the NPfIT, and continues to support its successor programs are standards developed 
for data transfer. Furthermore, organizational learning that took place should not be discounted. As Robertson 
et al. (2010, p.29) argue: “the complexities in scaling up from implementation of local small-scale systems to 
national systems for electronic health records are now far better understood.” We also note that post-NPfIT the 
government commitment to EHR, and more generally, to digitalize the NHS remains (DH, 2012). Although the 
technologies underpinning EHR and the strategies to implement it might be very different now, the notion that 
IT-enabled change in healthcare is necessary has taken hold not only at the government level but also in (at least 
some) healthcare organizations. 
6. CASE COMPARISON BETWEEN SINGAPORE AND ENGLAND 
We compare implementation efforts of national EHR systems in Singapore (NEHR) and in England (NCRS), 
highlighting both their similarities and differences. They show similarity in some aspects of the healthcare 
systems and challenges faced, but differ in their institutional environments prior to their national EHR program 
implementations, their stakeholder involvement, and their institutional processes during program 
implementation. We elaborate on these similarities and differences below. 
6.1 Healthcare Systems 
First and foremost, in both Singapore and UK, primary care is mainly provided through private GPs while acute 
care is largely provided through the public hospitals.  However, NHS in England has contracts with GPs for their 
provision of free services, whereas in Singapore citizens pay for primary care from GPs mainly by themselves. 
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Second, Singapore is considered highly efficient in healthcare provision according to the Bloomberg index16 
with high longevity, while spending only 4.92% of its GDP on healthcare. By the same index, UK performed 
moderately (ranked 21 out of 55 countries) and spent 9.12% of its GDP on healthcare. Third, both countries 
possess central coordinating agencies in healthcare, i.e., MOH and MOHH in Singapore, and DH and the NHS 
England in England, which are responsible for managing healthcare resources and national EHR programs. In 
addition, since UK has a larger population and area, there are also regional agencies responsible for healthcare 
resources management, such as SHAs and PCTs. The central coordinating agencies in both countries applied 
“top-down” implementation strategies for national EHR. 
6.2 Institutional Environment before EHR Implementation  
Even prior to EHR implementation, there were differences in the political environment and continuity 
surrounding both programs. Although there was political stability in England, with the Labour government in 
power between 1997-2010, NPfIT was “met with cross-political party disagreements about the nature and scope 
of the Programme” Currie (2012, p. 242-243), reflecting a hostile political setting for the program. This was 
compounded by discontinuities in NPfIT’s leadership, and re-organizations of the NHS and its governing bodies. 
Following a critical mass of negative National Audit Office reports (NAO 2006, 2008, 2011) as well as pressures 
from different stakeholders, NPfIT was dismantled when a new government came to power. In Singapore, 
continuity in the national government and in MOH management, allowed NEHR to progress on its planned 
trajectory even after key transitional events, which included the change of the health minister in 2011 and 
members of the MOHH NEHR management team in 2014.  Throughout NEHR implementation, the initial buy 
in and support of MOH never wavered. 
Second, these two countries also differed in their historical IT infrastructure for healthcare, which 
influenced their EHR system design choices. Prior to the National Programme for IT (NPfIT) a range of 
initiatives had attempted to introduce health informatics use in England. Specifically, public acute care had 
adopted a range of electronic patient record (EPR17) systems although there were few agreed standards, and 
uptake was patchy. GP practices and community pharmacies supplying services to the NHS had also adopted 
health informatics systems. In this sense, NPfIT had ambitious goals of procuring and integrating many IT 
systems and infrastructures (Campion-Awwad et al., 2014; NAO, 2011) and implementing shared EHR was 
arguably NPfIT’s most complex task. Furthermore, the combined size of the numerous NHS trusts was many 
times that of Singapore. By implementing NPfIT across such a large geographical area, the scale and complexity 
of the program increased significantly (Hendy et al., 2005). Therefore, the plan to ‘reap and replace’ all the 
existing EPRs and related systems in acute care with a new ‘mother of all systems’ and develop a single strategic 
solution for primary care was challenging to execute.   
                                                      
16 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-29/u-s-health-care-system-ranks-as-one-of-the-least-efficient 
17 EPR here is equivalent to Electronic Medical Record (EMR) in the Singapore case. 
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In contrast, whilst HIT systems in Singapore were to an extent fragmented, most patient records were 
stored in only 1 of 2 EHR systems (Eclipsys and CPSS). This made consolidation of information through the 2 
regional clusters i.e., NHG and SingHealth, while challenging, a much simpler task than that faced by England. 
This was especially true given that both were under MOHH’s governance. Coupled with the decision that NEHR 
was not to replace existing EMRs but ‘ride on top of them’, linking with them meant that national efforts occurred 
on a smaller scale with far less technical and non-technical complexity than NPfIT. Other factors that helped 
overcome fragmentation issues revolved around the simpler, flatter nature of Singapore and existing Health IT 
infrastructure in hospitals. Besides, before NEHR, there was an earlier integration effort, the electronic medical 
record exchange (EMRX) between clusters, although it only allowed document exchange. Furthermore, since 
there was quite limited adoption of EMR systems in the private sector, such as GP clinics, MOHH faced less 
challenge in integrating different legacy systems among these private stakeholders. MOH and MOHH attempted 
to promote NEHR among these private stakeholders through IT-enablement programs, which were directly 
linked to NEHR system. 
Third, the healthcare governance structures of both countries differ, which also led to differences in their 
national EHR project organization. The NHS has a highly fragmented organizational structure and work 
practices vary between its organizations. One of our interviewees suggested that the problem with NPfIT was 
with its underlying assumption that there was “this thing called NHS” [a cohesive organization, with clear 
governance structures] and that all people would gravitate to the program and accept “all being the same” 
[Director of Programs and Strategy, site 3]. Due to its governance structure, NPfIT had to involve a complex 
network of stakeholders with different roles and responsibilities, which evolved over time. For example, 
originally, NPfIT solutions for acute and primary care were delivered by regional Local Service Providers 
(LSPs). At the outset of the NPfIT program implementation of the CRS was conducted by Connecting for Health 
(CfH). However, by 2007, as the program progressed, oversight moved to a localized model, with SHAs 
providing oversight of implementation as part of the National Local Ownership Programme, although contract 
management remained with CfH. LSPs therefore had to respond to requests from regional Strategic Health 
Authorities rather than the national CfH.  
In contrast, as explained by the MOHH senior manager, NEHR “was planned, designed and managed, 
top-down from here (MOHH)”, which underscores the simpler, flatter healthcare organizational structure in 
Singapore. Specifically, there were 2 hierarchal layers, with MOH at the highest level, followed by MOHH, the 
latter being the holding company of all public healthcare assets includes statutory boards that oversee different 
aspects of healthcare. Indeed, it was the focal stakeholder responsible for NEHR delivery. Furthermore, 
MOHH’s subsidiary Integrated Health Information Systems (IHIS), that consolidated all public healthcare IT 
assets and manpower in healthcare organizations, helped MOHH facilitate the system integration work for 
NEHR project. Therefore, although in both countries, there existed central agencies responsible for designing 
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and delivery the EHR systems, such as CfH for the NPfIT and MOHH for NEHR, with commercial solution 
providers, MOHH, through IHIS, had a more direct involvement in designing the EHR systems than CfH did. 
Conversely, IT staff in healthcare organizations were more directly involved in designing EHR from the start, 
than in England. 
 In addition, the differences in healthcare system structures also contributed to the differences in their 
EHR project organizations. Particularly, national EHR programs in both countries were centrally funded, with 
the key systems and IT infrastructure provided for free to healthcare organizations. However, unlike the UK, 
where the healthcare organizations are largely funded by the NHS, Singapore’s primary care is dominated by 
private GP clinics. In Singaporean primary care, there was little IT infrastructure prior to NEHR, and even after 
the instigation of NEHR the government did not fully fund the primary care systems that would need to be linked 
to NEHR. Table 1 shows a comparison of the institutional context of the EHR implementation in both countries.  
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Table 1. Comparison of Institutional Context in Singapore and England 
Category Narrative: Singapore and England Implications for EHR implementation in the two countries 
Country 
context 
England‘s population is approximately 10 times Singapore’s, at 52.6 
million and area approximately 18 times greater at 130,265 km2 
Much greater number of healthcare providers in England, 
having implications for governance, number and type of 
systems in use. 
Healthcare 
provision: 
structure and 
autonomy of 
providers 
Both countries have a mix of public and private providers but acute care 
is largely provided by public hospitals. Simpler and flatter healthcare 
organizational structure in Singapore. In England, NHS organizations are 
heterogeneous with different work practices. The trend towards 
decentralization of decision making means that many of the trusts have 
their own budgets and increasing levels of autonomy.  
Structures in Singapore more suited to top down 
implementation process than in England. Heterogeneity of 
English NHS organizations makes integration and 
standardization more challenging.  
Existing IT 
infrastructure  
before EHR 
Mix of paper-based and electronic record in both countries with limited 
interoperability. In Singapore most patient records stored in 1 of 2 EHR 
systems. In England fragmented IT and proliferation of legacy systems. 
Challenging context in both countries, in terms of lack of 
standardization and interoperability, but more so in England.  
 
Project 
organization 
Programs in both countries are overseen by Health Ministry/Department. 
In Singapore, 2 layers of governance (MOHH and its sub-body IHIS); 
both responsible for designing and delivering of NEHR together with a 
private consortium.  In England more fragmented governance structures 
that evolve over time including regional bodies. CfH – organization in 
charge of the program delivery having less direct involvement in 
designing the systems than MOHH in Singapore.  
In Singapore centralized control over the implementation of 
EHR was maintained making integration through 
standardization more achievable. In England efforts to impose 
it were thwarted.  
Funding and 
Incentives 
Programs in both countries were centrally funded, with the key systems 
and IT infrastructure provided for free to public healthcare organizations, 
together with some technical and process support.  
England: Reluctance of healthcare organizations to spend time 
and money for implementation of unproven (even if free) 
system 
Singapore: Despite incentives most of the private provides did 
not take up the system (during the period covered here). 
Delivery of 
systems 
Both countries adopted a top-down implementation model, supplemented 
by bottom-up design efforts. In England (at least initially) the plan is to 
‘reap and replace’ all the existing EHRs and related systems in acute care 
with new ‘mother of all systems’. In Singapore NEHR is designed to 
‘ride on top’ of the existing EMRs and to be accessed directly through 
those systems or a Web portal. 
In England, stakeholders increasingly reluctant to abandon 
their existing (and working) systems for a promised (but not 
tested) new system for the greater good of integration. The plan 
for primary care to develop a single strategic solution is quickly 
abandoned. More flexible strategies in Singapore contributed to 
greater stakeholder acceptance.  
Stakeholders  In both countries there were three main sets of stakeholders directly 
involved in the project: administrative bodies overseeing and running the 
project, healthcare organizations and commercial solution providers, but 
in England these were more diverse and in addition other stakeholders 
became influential as the project progressed.  
Greater diversity of stakeholders in England, than in Singapore, 
creates additional challenges for project management.  
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6.3 Stakeholder Involvement and Institutional Processes during EHR Implementation 
Through our analysis, we found that during the implementation of NEHR and NCRS, different forms of 
isomorphism were driven by the key presence of normative, coercive, and mimetic pressures in the 
institutional environment, exercised top-down, bottom-up and horizontally. In both countries coercive 
pressures were exercised top-down from Health System Administrators on organizations responsible for 
the delivery of the programs (CfH and MOHH), and through those – on commercial solution providers, 
healthcare organizations, and by management of those on individuals. Those pressures were ‘soft’ and 
included financial incentives for early adopter sites, ‘free’ systems for all public providers (with software paid 
for centrally, but in England trusts bearing the costs of implementation, such as training and changeover 
processes), and ‘hard’, such as legislation (e.g., requiring trusts to have electronic health records, to report data 
which required such systems in place). In both countries, strong, top-down coercive pressures gave rise to 
bottom-up pressures by clinicians on healthcare integrators and commercial solution providers. However, 
those pressures varied in type and strength, and the way they interacted dynamically differed in the two 
countries. Ultimately they shaped results of the implementation efforts in different ways.  
In Singapore, as the central public agency managing healthcare assets, MOHH played an important 
role in achieving isomorphism. On one hand, MOHH was influenced by normative pressures from public 
healthcare providers to improve the design of NEHR, which further benefited the implementation of NEHR. 
On the other hand, it applied coercive pressures on various groups of healthcare providers to adopt NEHR. 
Unlike a “singular” form of isomorphism (i.e., all healthcare organizations adopting a similar IT platform 
to connect to NEHR), we observed different mechanisms of achieving isomorphism from MOHH, each 
confined to a particular care sector.  
First, in the Singapore public healthcare sector, access to NEHR was needed to get to each APH’s 
EMR. By employing coercive pressure, MOHH was able to enforce the use of NEHR among APHs and 
make them contribute their EMR data to NEHR. In turn, doctors and CMIOs in APHs exerted normative 
pressures on MOHH to enhance the design of NEHR. This was uniform across all the RHS clusters. As 
other public providers (e.g., polyclinics) were twinned to their respective healthcare cluster’s APH’s EMR 
system (because of their past SingHealth / NHG affiliation and the present RHS clusters), there was similar 
integration of these providers. Also, as a part of the vertical integration in each RHS, community hospitals 
were able to extend their respective APH’s EMR systems.  
Furthermore, our analysis suggests that when public agencies attempt to co-opt autonomous 
organizations, such as in Singapore when MOHH brought GP clinics into the fold, in addition to exerting 
coercive pressures directly through subsidies, agencies can exert such pressures through softer approaches, 
such as integrating funds to support integration of applications with the EHR web portal. Also, for different 
types of provider organizations, there could be different strategies and systems, e.g., CLEO for GP clinics 
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and NHELP for nursing homes. Based on the initial adoption of NEHR among these stakeholders (i.e., GPs 
and nursing homes), MOHH selected exemplar GPs and NHs to exert mimetic pressures on other parties 
(GPs and NHs) within the same sector. These different forms of isomorphism reflect the complexity of such 
a longitudinal program seeking to balance the interests of diverse stakeholders.  
In England, through contracting arrangement, DH enabled CfH to exert coercive pressures to 
oversee the delivery of NPfIT. By managing the contracts of delivering NPfIT, CfH could exert coercive 
power on NHS organizations and the regional administrative Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs). For 
example, initial deployment of NPfIT solutions to acute care settings involved the selection of sites by 
SHAs and deployment of coercive pressure from SHAs and DH.  
As in Singapore, different mechanisms of achieving isomorphism were pursued for different sectors 
(with different types of pressures applied and diverse systems offered to primary, mental and acute health) 
but in England those evolved significantly over time (e.g. local implementation plans were introduced in 
the latter parts of the program). However, unlike in Singapore, coercive pressures from government agencies 
often failed, counteracted by pressures from other stakeholders. The key difference was the ability of the 
professional bodies (such as BMA and Royal Colleges) in England to exert coercive pressures directly upon 
DH and CfH (e.g., BMA made calls to stop NCRS), and indirectly through normative pressures on 
clinicians (e.g., BMA advised its members to reject the system), who then employed coercive pressure on 
CfH and managers in healthcare organizations (through either explicit or implicit refusal to use the system 
and workarounds). The mechanisms of opposition employed by clinicians were the rhetoric of data and patient 
safety, whilst some administrative staff engaged in passive resistance. Patients groups and other pressure 
groups exerted normative/coercive pressures on administrators of health system and healthcare integration 
(DH and SHA) and media turned the public opinion against the NPfIT, giving a platform to dissatisfied 
voices. Commercial solution providers responded to pressures by either leaving the program, fighting the 
contract terms in court, or seeking to re-negotiate the contract. Hence, the employment of coercive pressures 
in the form of punitive contracts, at least in this case, was detrimental to the implementation effort. 
Softer coercive pressures, such as incentives, had some success in improving the take up of EHR 
systems (particularly within primary care). However, soft incentives did not work in all circumstances. 
Although our research shows that the Deployment Incentive Fund for acute trusts had played a role in some 
trusts agreeing to be early implementer sites, those positive effects were not lasting, countered by bottom-
up pressures. As early adopters struggled, healthcare organizations followed a ‘wait and see’ approach. 
Thus, unlike in Singapore, mimetic pressures between acute trusts had negative effects on adoption in 
England. 
Further, although in England, clinicians were seconded to NPfIT to represent clinical staff, those 
appointments came after key procurement decisions were made. Subsequent efforts to engage clinicians did not 
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alleviate their belief they were not “involved” in setting NPfIT’s direction (Currie, 2012). Our research indicates 
that clinical engagement and more broadly user engagement was problematic, at least partly due to contractual 
arrangements, complex supply chains, and formalized communication channels between hospitals, local service 
providers, software suppliers and CfH. In contrast, in Singapore, we noted that doctors representing different 
clinical interest groups were engaged very early on during the initial NEHR planning phase and continued to be 
so throughout subsequent phases. Also, they were separated into five task forces representing different clinical 
interests such that NEHR could be a system “for clinicians by clinicians” (MOHH, 2010; Muttitt et al., 2012).   
In our research, tensions between different, often conflicting, institutional logics were identified as 
posing challenges to NPfIT implementation. Our findings suggest that stakeholders were influenced by their 
immediate organization’s institutional logics (e.g., institutional logics of a leading teaching hospital that aims to 
set ‘best practice’) and that of their professions’ ‘logics’ (norms and behaviors). Both were strongly related to 
their professional identity. It would be simplistic, however, to assume all managers adhered to the same logic 
and were motivated by the same interests (Pouloudi et al. 2016). Our study revealed that IT managers in 
healthcare organizations often aligned themselves (at least partially) with healthcare professionals rather than 
CfH management. This supports Boonstra’s et al. (2017) finding that in hospital IT implementation IT staff 
accommodated polarization between medical professionalism and the managerial logic.  Stakeholders were 
able to effectively exercise power through calls to their own institutional logics, to exploit these to support 
their own interests. This created an environment in which there was continual re-modelling of the scope of 
the program. However, as the notion of stakeholder legitimacy and urgency suggest, the application of 
pressures are defined by timeliness of effort, and the context of application. Thus, during the deployment 
of the system, the acute care trust could exert coercive pressure on the LSP to influence the design of the 
systems. However, once an acute care trust signed off system this source of coercive pressure was lost. This 
led to frustration and contributed to dissatisfaction in the NPfIT implementation. 
Although in the Singapore case, we found different institutional logics among various stakeholders, i.e., 
professionalism logic of doctors and managerialism logic of MOHH managers, our analysis suggests that there 
were solutions to mitigate or even resolve the challenges brought on by competing institutional logics. The key 
mitigators in the Singapore case were the CMIOs, who were senior doctors familiar with IT. Working closely 
with other doctors in their institutions, as well as being convinced of NEHR’s value in obtaining efficiencies, 
they espoused both professionalism and managerialism logics (i.e., they played a role of ‘boundary spanners’, 
individuals who are able to facilitate the sharing of knowledge by connecting two or more groups of people 
separated by location, hierarchy, or function (Levina & Vaast, 2005), and, in our case, also embracing different 
logics). Thus, CMIOs were able to bridge communication gaps between the central coordinating public agency, 
MOHH, and NEHR’s direct users, e.g., doctors/clinicians. Since they were powerful and legitimate in both 
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groups, they could exert both coercive and normative influences during NEHR design and adoption, thus playing 
an important role in facilitating the process.  
In this regard, Singapore’s decision of having Chief Medical Information Officers (CMIOs) in key 
public care institutions (e.g., APHs) championing NEHR helped manage such institutional logics differences 
during its implementation.  This was corroborated by our interviewees consistently highlighting the critical roles 
that APH CMIOs played in bridging gaps between clinicians and IT professionals. Their inputs helped define 
NEHR so that it was clinically relevant and in the process, they acted as mediators managing potentially 
competing institutional logics as part of their assigned change management roles. As the result the two logics 
were not in direct opposition to each other with regard to NEHR, and equilibrium was eventually achieved. 
In England clinical leads co-opted into administrative body (CfH), to bridge managerialism and medical 
professionalism logics, either became disillusioned with the program and the nature of clinical engagement 
and left the post, or were unable to bring others to support the program. Different logics of managerialism, 
medical professionalism, as well market and engineering logics espoused by some private solution 
providers and bureaucratic logics of healthcare administrative bodies continued to be in conflict. 
Particularly, although the idea of EHRs was viewed positively by the majority of healthcare professionals, 
its particular manifestation, NCRS, was increasingly seen as detrimental to day-to-day patient care, and 
hence conflicting with medical professionalism logic, and thus to be resisted. The bureaucratic logic of CfH 
was seen as obstructing implementation and adoption of NCRS. Table 2 shows a comparison of the 
stakeholder interactions and institutional pressures in the two countries. 
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Table 2. Comparison of Stakeholder Interactions and Institutional Processes in Singapore and England 
Analytical 
concepts 
Narrative: Singapore and England Implications for EHR in the two 
countries 
Theoretical contributions 
Dynamics 
and groups 
of 
stakeholder 
interactions 
Stakeholder composition 
In both countries, there were four key groups of stakeholders: 1) 
agencies responsible for health system administration, e.g., DH and 
SHAs in England and MOH in Singapore; 2) central coordinating 
agencies managing national EHR program, i.e., CfH in England and 
MOHH in Singapore; 3) healthcare organizations; and 4) commercial 
solution providers.  
In both countries, authority and resources passed from health system 
administration agencies to central coordinating agencies for national 
EHR programs. From those, MOHH and CfH drew power and 
(contested, at least in England) legitimacy to deliver EHRs. In 
England, professional organizations, patients groups and media also 
became influential stakeholders.  
Role of central coordinating agencies 
In both countries, central coordinating agencies managed contracts 
with the commercial solution providers for EHR implementation. In 
Singapore, MOHH subsidiary IHIS, specialized in system integration 
and implementation, was responsible for the collaboration with 
commercial solution providers limiting their influence over the 
system design and implementation.   
In England, CfH oversaw the implementation process, negotiating 
between healthcare organizations and solution providers, but did not 
take an active part in EHR design. IT managers and staff based in 
healthcare organizations had less involvement in the initial design of 
EHR than in Singapore. Contractual arrangements limited the ability 
of healthcare organizations to directly interact with commercial 
solution providers and to negotiate EHR design. This curtailed their 
power over solution providers, but also resulted in exercising power 
using safety argument as a last resort.  
Involvement of healthcare professionals 
MOHH and CfH attempted to engage healthcare professionals in 
EHR programs, but in England this was problematic (and initiated 
too late). In Singapore, MOHH managed to enroll the support of IT 
In Singapore, even though the 
systems were designed and 
deployed by commercial solution 
providers, the involvement of 
IHIS helped MOHH develop a 
better understanding of the 
technical solution and hold tighter 
control over it.   
In England, contractual 
arrangements led to 
dissatisfaction of healthcare 
stakeholders, IT staff and 
commercial solution providers. 
Interactions between media, 
patient groups and professional 
bodies reinforced resistance to 
NCRS. Clinician groups in 
healthcare organizations 
supported by the collective efforts 
of professional bodies were able 
to resist governing agencies to 
implement EHR. This did not 
occur in Singapore. 
 
When clinicians exercise 
coercive rather than normative 
pressure on the central 
coordinating agency along with 
the collective support of their 
professional bodies, the role of 
the agency in managing EHR 
implementation may be 
compromised. This may lead to 
unstable dynamics of the 
opposing forces and eventual 
abandonment of the system. In 
contrast, if institutional 
conditions exist to take into 
account normative pressures 
exerted by clinicians to 
iteratively improve the system, 
this may result in a positive 
cycle of opposing pressures and 
eventual equilibrium in the 
system implementation when all 
parties are satisfied with it. 
When there is an agency, such as 
IHIS, specialized in EHR 
implementation, comprised of IT 
staff from healthcare 
organizations but allied to the 
central coordinating agency 
(such as MOHH), and directly 
working with commercial 
providers to shape EHR, this can 
reduce the power of the 
commercial solution providers 
and enable the central 
coordinating agency to exercise 
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employees in hospitals and CMIOs - senior doctors with technical 
knowledge. Feedback from healthcare professionals shaped EHR 
design. In England, different healthcare organizations had disparate 
systems’ requirements, but the goal of delivering standardized 
software limited their scope for customizing EHR to their needs. 
better control over the EHR 
implementation process. 
Institutional 
pressures 
Top-down institutional pressures 
In both countries, top-down coercive pressures were exercised by 
administrators on organizations responsible for the delivery of the 
programs, and through those – on commercial solution providers, 
healthcare organizations, and by management of those on individuals. 
Those pressures were ‘strong’ (e.g. contractual arrangements or 
legislation) or ‘soft’ (e.g. incentives). Coercive pressures on primary 
care were ‘softer’ than on acute care, reflecting their respective 
private and public status.  Top-down normative pressures were 
exercised in both countries through the appeal for the need of shared, 
standardized EHR to support healthcare integration, to deliver better 
and more efficient healthcare.  
Bottom-up institutional pressures 
Bottom-up normative pressures both in Singapore and England 
were exerted by clinicians on healthcare integrators, managers and 
commercial solution providers. Key difference was that in England 
normative pressures morphed into bottom-up coercive pressures. 
Pressure groups and media exerted coercive pressures on the program 
administrators. In Singapore, counter pressures from clinicians were 
much weaker, and were exercised through lower take up of NEHR 
but over time were largely addressed.  
Horizontal institutional pressures 
In England, horizontal normative pressures were exercised by 
clinical professional bodies on clinicians, whilst in Singapore by 
CMIOs on clinicians within the hospitals. In both countries mimetic 
pressures were encouraged by government agencies through early 
adopter initiatives. 
In both countries, strong, top-
down coercive pressures gave rise 
to bottom-up, counter-pressures. 
Bottom-up counter pressures were 
much stronger in England and 
gained momentum over time 
resulting in stalled NCRS 
implementation and abandoning 
the NPfIT. 
In both countries soft coercive 
pressures (incentives) had some 
success in improving take up of 
the systems (more limited in 
England). Mimetic pressures 
between healthcare organizations 
had positive effects on adoption 
in Singapore and negative in 
England.  
 
The choice of coercive pressures 
should account for stakeholders’ 
power and status. Strong 
coercive pressures tend to result 
in counter-pressures and are 
unlikely to be productive when 
applied on autonomous, 
powerful stakeholders. Soft 
coercive pressures appear to be 
more effective.  
Normative, bottom-up pressures, 
if not addressed, may morph into 
bottom-up coercive pressures 
(under enabling institutional 
conditions) and through their 
interactions strengthen each 
other. Mimetic pressures may 
have different effects, depending 
on outcomes of implementation 
by early adopters. 
 
Institutional 
logics 
Synthesis vs. conflict between different institutional logics  
Managerialism and medical professionalism logics were present in 
both countries. In Singapore, MOHH managers and CMIOs became 
‘boundary spanners’, straddling managerialism and medical 
In Singapore, NEHR was seen as 
helping to provide better care and 
hence supporting medical 
In an environment of conflicting 
institutional logics IT 
implementation is challenging 
but can be made to work with the 
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professionalism logics in order to pursue NEHR program. The two 
logics were not in direct opposition to each other with regard to 
NEHR. Normative pressures from hospital doctors influenced NEHR 
design and enabled a better fit with healthcare professionals’ needs. 
In England, clinicians co-opted into CfH to bridge managerialism and 
medical professionalism logics, did not convince clinicians to support 
NCRS. Different logics continued to be in conflict. 
professionalism, as well as 
managerialism logics.  
In England, NCRS was seen as 
detrimental to day-to-day patient 
care, and conflicting with medical 
professionalism logic, thus 
resisted. Bureaucratic logic of 
CfH was seen by some as 
obstructing implementation and 
adoption of NCRS.  
help of ‘boundary spanners’, 
providing they maintain their 
legitimacy.  
Implementation of EHR may not 
necessary be in conflict with 
medical professionalism logic if 
it is seen as helping to provide 
better care. 
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 6.4 Comparison Conclusion 
We presented cases of two countries in which broadly similar top-down strategies of EHR implementation 
resulted in different implementation outcomes. It is clear that the size of the country matters, influencing the 
scope and complexity of the programs. However, the difference between the institutional conditions run deeper 
than that, and include stakeholder heterogeneity and their different abilities to exercise power and claim 
legitimacy of their position in relation to EHR. Furthermore, existing IT infrastructure (before the program), 
project organization and delivery models, and the technological solutions proposed shape the attitudes and 
interactions/dynamics between stakeholders.  
In Singapore, with few levels of hierarchy, a lesser number of public health organizations (APHs and 
polyclinics), relatively few legacy systems, and with a centralized public agency (MOHH) responsible for 
managing healthcare resources, with IHIS taking active role in working with private solution providers on 
designing the systems, it was possible to execute the national NEHR project fairly smoothly. The cluster- or 
region-based public healthcare system, which facilitates vertical integration, enabled MOHH to roll out NEHR 
for each Regional Healthcare Service. However, bringing all private healthcare providers on board and 
facilitating patient sharing of data still remains a challenge18. 
In comparison, England’s institutional field of healthcare was characterized by heterogeneous, 
powerful stakeholders, such as healthcare professionals and their representative bodies, semi-autonomous 
organizations with significant variations in practices (i.e., different ways of delivering care), and many 
different legacy systems. Those presented challenging conditions for healthcare integration through EHR. 
However, the differences between the two countries also include project organization and implementation 
models. An implementation model based on ideas of ‘rip and replace’ and ‘ruthless standardization’ that 
attempted to deliver a single information system that meets the needs of all local healthcare providers is 
now widely seen as very problematic (Clegg & Shepherd, 2007; Currie & Guah, 2007; Currie, 2012; 
Pouloudi et al., 2016). In England there was a mismatch between healthcare structures and the trend towards 
decentralization of decision making and the top-down nature of NCRS delivery. In contrast, although 
Singapore’s aim was also to deliver integrated care, and the healthcare structure was more suited to top down 
implementation process, the implementation model allowed for existing IT systems to co-exist with NEHR 
(which was designed to ‘ride on top of them’). We also note how the characteristics of technology 
influenced outcomes. Thus, in England more progress was made to implement NCRS in trusts that had 
Cerner-based software, rather than Lorenzo – which struggled to deliver a complex system de novo. 
Furthermore, other systems developed under NPfIT, such as the Electronic Prescription Service and 
                                                      
18 http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/national-electronic-health-records-need-a-check-up 
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Summary Care record were eventually adopted (although this has been a much slower process than initially 
anticipated).  
The above points should not be conceptualized as static ‘factors’ but rather as evolving conditions 
that affected attitudes of stakeholders and dynamic interactions between them. Thus, it is in those 
interactions, with stakeholders influenced by and drawing on institutional logics, making conflicting claims 
regarding legitimacy of their views, and seeking to shape views and actions of each other, that the 
institutional pressures played out. Ultimately, in Singapore those pressures reached some sort of 
equilibrium, which refers to a state of balance or a stable situation, and facilitated the adoption of NEHR, 
whilst in England counter-pressures gained momentum over time and resulted in stalled or abandoned 
implementations of NCRS in England. 
7. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Theoretical Contributions 
This study adds to the extant literature through a comparative examination of the organizational and social 
processes during complex national healthcare integration projects. As noted in prior studies (Currie & Finnegan, 
2009), such forms of healthcare integration involve intricate organizational and social processes. However, it is 
a complex phenomenon (Currie, 2012) that has received relatively less research attention. Particularly, for 
Singapore, we believe this is the first piece of socio-technical research based on the NEHR program given its 
relative infancy, and its ongoing implementation, at the time of writing. Unlike Sinha et al.’s (2013) report, which 
provides a factual account of NEHR’s progress through secondary sources, this research explores a broader 
range of issues and stakeholders, while applying two relevant theoretical lenses on both primary and secondary 
data sources. This can should aid future researchers’ understanding of NEHR’s progress during its formative 
years. 
Additionally, this study contributes to institutional literature by complementing prior research in 
several ways. First, we reaffirm here that institutional forces (i.e., normative and mimetic) can indeed occur 
on an international, governmental basis. This was reflected in the travel of EHR ideas from Canada to 
Singapore through the overseas professionals engaged for NEHR. This also adds to an area of literature 
which has been under-researched (Kuipers et al., 2014). Second, apart from healthcare’s two well-known 
institutional logics (Yeow & Faraj, 2011) and the recognition that “de-professionalization” (one of the 
logics) can occur (Yang et al., 2013), we found that there can be stakeholders that embody a mix of both 
logics simultaneously. This was observed in MOHH managers and CMIOs in the Singapore case who 
straddled logics in order to pursue NEHR program while seeking buy-in from doctors. In the English case 
we also identified engineering and bureaucratic logics as an additional form of logics in this context. Third, 
we further develop Pouloudi’s et al. (2016) contribution that illustrates how power of stakeholders affects 
how they exert their influence, not only at the organizational level, but also at the political (government 
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agency level).   Our research shows the type of pressures different stakeholders exerted on each other to 
influence decisions regarding EHR implementation both at the organizational and political levels, and how 
their power, legitimacy, as well as urgency of their claims may have affected their ability to do so.  
We observed isomorphic pressures working in complex ways and reflecting different institutional 
logics. Both of our cases illustrate multiplicity of pressures on different levels and variety of responses 
(counter-pressures) resulting in different dynamics. Coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures were often 
bidirectional or multi-directional in our cases, usually vertical and top-down, e.g., applied by governmental 
agencies to healthcare stakeholders, and bottom-up e.g., exercised in response to those, but also horizontal, 
e.g., exercised across different healthcare institutions and professional associations, and within those. How 
and when such pressures are employed, what form they take (e.g., what type of incentives and mandatory 
requirements they entail) and how stakeholders respond to them (e.g. by building an opposition) influences 
the outcomes of change programs.  
We illustrated that broadly similar coercive pressures (legislation) were applied in England and 
Singapore with different outcomes. This indicates that it is difficult to make over-reaching, generalized 
statements regarding strength and outcomes of isomorphic forces. They are intertwined with their 
institutional, geographical and temporal context, and with characteristics of the technology and strategies 
for its implementation. Our IS literature review revealed studies that found coercive pressures positively 
influencing IT adoption (Sherer et al., 2016) and reporting opposite effects (Klöcker et al., 2014), and 
mimetic pressures having positive effects on IT adoption (Sherer et al., 2016; Klöcker et al., 2014), whilst 
in our study of NCRS they were detrimental. Nevertheless, both cases have indicated that coercive pressures 
exercised directly through payments for EHR implementation (e.g., subsidies in Singapore, free software 
in England and additional payments to early adopters) can be successfully supported by other approaches 
such as indirect incentives or requirements. For example, in Singapore this involved funding for integration 
of systems with the EHR web portal, and in England this involved payments for GP outcomes which would 
necessitate provision of reports made much more easily with EHRs. Hence, we propose that the choice of 
coercive pressures should account for stakeholders’ power and status. Specifically, strong coercive 
pressures tend to result in counter-pressures and are unlikely to be productive when applied on autonomous, 
powerful stakeholders. Soft coercive pressures appear to be more effective.  
The English case illustrates that under enabling institutional conditions (such as the existence of 
historically powerful professions and semi-autonomous organizations) normative, bottom-up pressures, if 
not addressed, may morph into bottom-up coercive pressures. Over time, these may gain momentum, result 
in unstable dynamics, and ultimately adversely affect HIT implementation. The two cases show how 
mimetic pressures may have different effects, depending on outcomes of implementation by early adopters. 
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Additionally, implementation of HIT may not necessarily be in conflict with healthcare professionalism 
logic, if HIT is seen as helping to provide better patient care and evolves in response to normative pressures 
from healthcare professionals. The Singapore case illustrates that in an environment of conflicting 
institutional logics IT implementation can be made to work with the help of ‘boundary spanners’. However, 
in order to be effective they must be able to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of other stakeholders. 
Further, this study adds to the HIT literature regarding perceptions of IT as enabler of national 
healthcare. Our cases show that despite different visions of EHR, repeated failures and continuing challenges of 
IT implementation, the notion of IT as an integral part of healthcare is becoming taken for granted, as expressed 
in the national policies we have reviewed (DH, 2012), and by our interviewees. As argued by Avgerou (2000), 
IT adoption in organizations is sustained through its own institutional forces. However, our studies in English 
hospitals reveals a ‘duality’ of attitudes - positive towards future idealized EHRs and often negative towards 
present offerings, reflecting an intriguing paradox on this salient issue.  
Last, our proposed framework provides a useful conceptual tool for analyzing such complex IS 
implementations across multiple stakeholders. Additionally, its instantiations through the two disparate cases in 
our study offers a methodological contribution to the literature in the following ways. First, we propose 
categories for comparing HIT implementations in different countries (see Tables 1 and 2 and Appendix E). 
Second, we illustrate how multi-level analysis, building on individual accounts and on secondary sources 
(presenting organizational level perspective), may be undertaken in order to construct a picture of different 
types of stakeholders interacting and influencing each other dynamically. Although, ultimately, pressures 
are experienced and enacted by individuals (which may or may not belong to an organization) in national 
programs pressures are often expressed as expectations of what an organization should achieve (e.g., policy 
papers outlining targets), and are addressed through organizational strategies. Hence a study spanning those 
different levels can deliver additional insights. Third, since how stakeholders experience and respond to 
pressures is constructed in relation to other stakeholders, and since power relations between them are 
potentially unstable (Pouloudi et al. 2016), we propose that to understand those processes future research 
needs to include an ecology of stakeholders and multiplicity of pressures, and to show how dynamic 
interactions between them have developed over time, as is done in our study.  
7.2 Practical Implications 
We believe our study could support practitioners in enhancing healthcare integration through implementing a 
national EHR. Specifically, first, in addition to factors noted above in the England-Singapore comparison, our 
findings indicate that even within the same profession, different stakeholders had differing interests. In particular, 
doctors operating in public vs. private domains had to be engaged differently to gain their buy in. Government 
planners may be able to exert more influence on public healthcare providers (e.g., APHs) than private providers, 
as the public providers are reliant on them for funds, making the public sector a natural starting point for such 
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an implementation program. However this strategy may not be appropriate for the private sector. Rather, 
planners may need to leverage their access to other resources (e.g., subsidies, patient pools) to produce an 
effective mix of incentives in order to encourage private providers to join the program. To ensure maximization 
of resources and long term gains, incentives and subsidies should achieve synergies with other initiatives (e.g., 
as part of an overall healthcare IT master plan). The key challenge for engaging the private sector is to gain a 
“critical mass” of healthcare providers so as to derive and demonstrate value for existing participants, thereby 
attracting new program participants. 
Furthermore, central planners must consider change management issues within providers, as most 
providers have existing patient record systems that are to be replaced or integrated with or have paper-based 
records or both. Continuous engagement efforts would be needed to address diverse views of healthcare 
stakeholders even after initial implementation, to ensure sustained adoption. Key to this are stakeholders who 
are able to “see both sides” of the program such as the CMIO as described in the Singapore case. Additionally, 
patients are an integral part of this program as they ultimately stand to benefit from it. Their concerns such as 
confidentiality and privacy must be addressed visibly, in order to avoid setbacks as seen in England’s case. This 
also requires an effective media management strategy for such initiatives. 
This study also provides practitioners with insights on managing key stakeholders (e.g., clinicians). 
Clinicians are often direct users of IT and play an important role in the progress of EHR implementation. 
Therefore planners need to ensure that: 1) their clinical needs are adequately represented in the program from 
start to end; 2) mechanisms are in place to continually address feedback so as to facilitate improvements even 
after the program implementation; 3) potentially unclear areas (e.g., responsibilities and liabilities) introduced 
by integration should be clarified with the program’s management, and clinicians informed and consulted. 
Nonetheless, it is recognized that there can be a diversity of opinions even within this group. As such, a 
systematic and consolidated approach to implement the above recommendations could be performed through 
professional bodies and associations, who are regarded as majority representative of doctors’ needs. The 
problems of clinical engagement in England suggest that healthcare professionals need to be engaged early on 
when substantial decisions regarding the scope and mode of EHR implementation are being decided. Differences 
between healthcare professionals’ expectations of the ideal system and the implemented one need careful 
ongoing management. Allied health professionals and administrative staff, although perhaps less powerful than 
doctors, are important for successful implementation and use of EHRs and thus should be included in 
engagement activities. 
Finally, our findings indicate that where plurality in institutional arrangements exist (and to some extent 
are inevitable) different mechanisms of institutional pressures, e.g., based on incentives and flexible standards 
(Hanseth & Bygstad, 2015) not ruthless standardization, and coercive targets that are linked to quality of care 
rather than particular technology (and thus allowing for plurality of EHR solutions) are likely to be more 
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successful. In both the cases, the eventual systems that worked had a mix of technology solutions that were 
interoperable. EHRs that seek to deliver ambitious and comprehensive solutions are more risky and require 
sustained commitment from large number of stakeholders. However, when benefits are not immediately 
realizable such commitment is hard to secure. Thus, modular solutions that allow modular implementation 
strategies are more likely to succeed (Aanestad, & Jensen, 2011). Going forward, EHRs are more likely to 
be envisaged as platforms on which different applications can be built and as portals to different applications, 
rather than as monolithic information systems. For example, both cases indicate a need to build analytics and 
patient-use applications on top of the EHR.   
7.3 Limitations and Future Work  
As with other research, this study also entails certain limitations. First, our integrative framework provides a 
means for exploring the phenomenon over time systematically, but does not provide predictive power as a 
variance model could. Nevertheless, the in-depth findings obtained from instantiating our framework across 
EHR implementations in England and Singapore have their own, significant value. Second, we chose two cases 
of national EHR implementations representing a largely public vs. a hybrid healthcare system. A natural 
extension in future work would be to examine EHR implementation in a largely private healthcare system, such 
as in the U.S. Additionally, we could be questioned about the applicability of our findings to IT integration in 
other industries. While we believe that many of the complex organizational and social issues discussed in this 
research are applicable to IT integration in general (such as deprecating existing IT systems), further validation 
would be required in other sectors.  
Third, there are related aspects of research that we briefly mentioned but could not expand upon due to 
our existing focus. These include, understanding mechanisms by which institutional pressures emerge, 
elaborating on different approaches to EHR integration, and examining patient related issues (e.g., patient 
participation in innovation). These topics provide fruitful directions for future research. Other related topics to 
explore would be the implementation of IT enablement programs for a specific care sector e.g., those with lower 
IT maturity, such as nursing homes and GP clinics in Singapore. As each IT system brings with it its own set of 
business rules, it may be valuable to study the impact it has on providers’ work arrangements, especially those 
that have not used electronic records within their practices before. This can help extend our knowledge beyond 
health IT systems within hospitals or other tertiary care organizations. Furthermore, the funding models and 
contractual arrangements of such programs need to be explored.  
Healthcare information systems are in a state of constant development, with public projects emerging 
and being abandoned as political and organizational leadership changes. The research outlined here provides a 
framework for describing the institutional pressures and influences among stakeholders that we believe to be 
salient in determining the success of such efforts – in this case the development, implementation, and adoption 
of EHR. Additionally, in future, IS research will need to look beyond the delivery of EHR, to its application in 
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use and the factors that shape such application. The findings from our research can provide a foundation for such 
future work. 
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Appendix A: Summary of Data Sources of Singapore Case (NEHR) 
Table 3. Primary Data Sources for the Singapore Case (NEHR) 
Sector Organization Role* Source 
Public Ministry of Health (MOH) Senior Clinician  5 
Ministry of Health Holdings (MOHH) Senior Manager 4 
Senior Clinician and IT 
Advocate 
2 
IT Manager 13 
Agency of Integrated Care (AIC) Senior Manager 7 
Integrated Health Information Systems 
(IHIS) 
Senior Manager  1 
Senior Manager 8 
Acute Public Hospitals (APHs)  
 APH1 
 APH2 
CMIO (APH1) 11 
Senior Manager (APH1) 9 
Manager (APH2) 12 
Private/Non
-profit 
Polyclinics# (P1)  Doctor 3 
Polyclinics# (P2) Doctor 6 
Community Hospital/Nursing Home Doctor  14, 
General Practitioner (GP) Practice Doctor (2) 10, 15 
 
Appendix B: Evidence of Findings of the Singapore Case (NEHR) 
Source: Indicates the origin of the quote, this may be from a primary source (as numbered in Table 1) or 
secondary source. 
Table 4. Institutional Pressures 
Pressure Quote Source 
[1. CP]  The ministry (MOH) here propagates the policies, works out a broad 
funding, works with MOF (ministry of finance), MOHH then develops 
specifications with user entities (which) then carry out instructions of 
MOH. 
 We (MOH) govern the process (NEHR) through the MOH community. 
5 
 No, we (MOHH) were like an agent of MOH. So MOH said okay, we 
pass to you (MOHH), subcontract to you, deliver. 4 
[2A. MP]  Slides showing comparisons and similarities of Singapore’s MOHH 
and Canada’s Health Infoway organization. Modelling of MOHH’s 
Information System Division and proposed NEHR solution after 
Canada’s EHR system 
Muttitt (2008) 
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[2B. NP]  MOHH brought in Canadian consultants as part of the MOHH NEHR 
IT team (Travels of ideas), which influenced the developments of the 
NEHR project.   
Muttitt (2008) 
 There was a lot of foreign experts that came, Canada, Australia. 3 
 MOHH Publicity brochure about NEHR, showed NEHR team 
composition of foreign staff members. 
MOHH (2010) 
[3A. NP]  What our clinicians need (based on their consultation with clinicians) Brooks (2010) 
 More than 200 clinicians were engaged in driving the business and 
information requirements of NEHR system. 
UNPAN 
(2013) 
 These doctors gave feedback. 8 
 In terms of NEHR, I am fairly involved with the folks at MOHH 
regarding how to do, what to do and so on. 
10 
 I was part of the summary care community, what do we want in the 
summary care first page. 
 That part I know was all ground feedback we used ground feedback, 
this is what we want, we are talking about standardization, privacy, 
confidentiality, all the x-rays. 
3 
 Formation of clinical task forces (hierarchy)  Muttitt (2008) 
 Help clinicians contextualize/ make the IT system relevant to them.  2 
 They will specify and dictate their requirements on what they want, 
right down to how things are displayed on screens. 1 
 I showed how you can do a national EMR… My argument was single 
EMR, single database is way too expensive. And everybody must move 
in the same movement, it’s very painful and expensive…single 
database… I thought was a better idea (reflects discussion process).  
7 
[3B.NP]  The CMIO plays a pivotal role by providing critical clinical 
directions and inputs on the requirements, design, implementation 
and use of medical information. 
12 
[3C. NP]  We [IHIS] played the middleware role and we also played the 
operational, architectural [roles], because operationally how to 
weave in NEHR into the operations. We provided that knowledge 
about the ground operations for NEHR team. 
 So our governance, what IHIS contributes is really the governance. 
 So, then down there, project management teams, always involve IHIS 
folks and the users together. 
8 
[3D.CP]  IHIS then was tasked at that time to execute (implementing acute 
hospital EMR to community hospitals). 
 So we (IHIS) actually provided the community hospitals the system 
which we implement (the EMR system that acute hospitals used) 
 MOHH decides and provides a list of recommended suitable 
organizations (for NEHR) to IHIS. There is a team at MOHH who 
designed/ are the architects of NEHR, they are an IT team. They work 
with the IHIS hospital supporting team to provide the technical 
connectivity (hospitals). Concurrently, the MOHH team drives NEHR 
efforts with healthcare organization user engagement. 
1 
[3E.NP]  Designers of the NEHR need to know what information doctors use in 
NEHR for reference.  1 
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 Following the inception of IHIS, in 2008, we were 600 people then, 
500 staff + 100 contractors and these were all taken from the then IT 
departments of NHG and SingHealth (two healthcare clusters). 
[4.CP]  The Accenture led consortium are system integrators, more technical 
in nature and they do the infrastructure and development of NEHR.  1 
 The contract to implement Phase 1 of Singapore’s National Electronic 
Health Record has been awarded to an Accenture-led consortium, 
with target roll-out of the NEHR in April 2011 
MOH 2010 
[5A.NP]  Working with Accenture, MOHH invested in the development of a 
goal-state architecture. 
Accenture 
2012 
[5B.NP]  By using screen mock-ups of NEHR in clinician workshops, the team 
in Singapore was able to identify which features and functionalities 
appealed to end users. The project team engaged clinicians as early 
as possible in the process, in order to understand their preferences 
and help drive towards a simpler and more intuitive interface. 
Accenture 
2012 
[6A. CP]  The public healthcare sector… fully owned by us (MOHH). The 
minister can make a decision, and the family (public healthcare 
institutions) has to comply… when the instruction or the policy 
directions have been made at the government level, you’re with it.  
4 
 NEHR is free. Free to the provider, free to the patient and funded by a 
capital grant from the government and to that extent, MOF (ministry 
of finance). 
13 
 Amongst others, the Ministry (MOHH through MOH) provide funding 
assistance (to public hospitals). 12 
 It was planned, designed and managed, top-down from here (MOHH). 
 MOHH team drives NEHR efforts 4 
 MOHH administers the money. 8 
 Stat body (MOHH) that is the effector arm of policies. 5 
[6B. CP]  SingHealth Institutions may handle personal data using IT platforms 
and tools promulgated by MOH, MOHH or other like body including, 
but not limited to the National Electronic Health Records (“NEHR”) 
system. SingHealth Institutions apply and require the application of 
reasonable and defensible security and access controls in the use of 
such systems, such that organisations other than the SingHealth 
Institution treating or transacting with you have only such access as is 
on a need to know basis for purposes and in a manner consistent with 
this DPP (Data Protection Policy) and/or where (and to the extent) 
necessary to meet your needs. 
EHA (2014); 
SingHealth 
(2014) 
 As healthcare providers, EHA (Eastern Health Alliance) Members 
and/or its staff are subject to and regulated by various statutes and 
regulations such as the Medical Registration Act, Singapore Medical 
Council Guidelines etc. Additionally, special legislation may apply to 
certain healthcare scenarios, 
[7A. NP]  Every time they (MOHH) launch one version they make us test it. 
 We basically told them no one was going to use it 11 
 The doctors said “No you cannot shutdown the EMRX” 
 This thing [EMRX] to get so stuck in the whole mind-set to get stuck 
in the workflow that they say no you cannot shut this off. 
4 
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[7B. NP]  They (CMIOs) will specify and dictate their requirements on what 
they want, right down to how things are displayed on screens.  
 They (CMIOs) are very involved in the process.  
1 
[7C. NP]   They (CMIOs) are authority to convince/influence their fellow 
colleagues (doctors).  
 They (CMIOs) do the change management 
1 
 I (CMIO) am also supposed to be the change champion 11 
[8A/ 8B/ 
8C/ 8D. 
CP] 
 Now we are the one forcing them (GPs) if they want to link with 
NEHR, not only you take from me, you need to give back. In order to 
give back, you need to be electronic. 
 They (NHs) will want to plug in because you’ve got only 20% of the 
pool, I’ve got 80% and as we integrate care, then… (patients are) 
going to go out of the acute hospital boundaries right down to the 
community. So if you don’t plug in, you (will be left out) 
 We are telling (GPs) them if you want to continue taking (subsidies) 
you have to start giving in return (to NEHR) and you need to hook up. 
 There were already other programs quite unrelated to CLEO. The 
chronic disease management program which allowed Medisave to be 
used. 
 Then CHAS came in and these are the little goodies and different 
grades if you are a very progressive clinic and you sign on to all these 
programs, yes then reciprocal there is this IT system that is available 
and we will subsidize a little bit of it to put it in place for you. That’s 
how you get it started. 
 That’s why the CHAS chronic disease is a very fundamental piece, 
then yes, you join but if you join then you have to accept that this 
(NEHR, IT systems) is part of this whole package of providing care 
for your patients right? Because if you are not going to do it… you 
don’t get the patient, 
 A lot of the schemes now they have been coming out the subsidies 
schemes for the elderly is are all linked to this system (of which NEHR 
is part of) 
 The CHAS, the chronic management system, disease management 
program and all that requires electronic submissions. So 1 way or 
another – you going to have to buy yourself a desktop and you got to 
put a system there to either through the web or you have a direct link 
but you need to create that portal to submit information back to us. 
Sooner or later and if you want these patients, then you have to do 
this. 
4 
[9. MP]  Sooner or later… if you (GPs) want these patients, then you have to 
do this (be IT-enabled and use NEHR) 
 Very progressive people who were ready to go 
4 
 Likeminded doctors who want(ed) to look after patients better 3 
 When I started there was only 10 (GPs onboard NEHR). 10 
 Sees a selected group of general practitioners testing the platform in 
their clinics. 
Hui (2012) 
 Recently, electronic information exchange was extended beyond 
private primary care and … more than 230 general practitioner (GP) 
clinics. 
CNA (2014) 
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 As of February 2015, about 550 (or 37% of 1,500) private GP clinics 
have access to NEHR, up from about 190 in March last year. 
MOH (2015) 
[10. MP]  What I [hospital senior manager] intend to do when we talk to the 
nursing homes, we will bring along the nursing homes who have 
already adopted NEHR to come and share with them the usefulness. 
So I think it is easier to get one of the champion to sell rather than for 
us. They will probably say what you know about NEHR, what you 
know about the operations at the nursing homes who you think will 
need. So I think the nursing homes who have used NEHR, voiced out it 
is useful. So it is better for them to sell the thing 
9 
 
Appendix C: Summary of Data Sources of England Case (NPfIT) 
* Number in brackets indicate number of people interviewed
Table 5. Primary Data Sources for the England Case (NPfIT) 
Sector Organization Role 
Private  Local Service Provider Manager (2)* 
Software Company Software developer (2) 
Public  Hospital trusts  Healthcare professional (14) 
Clinical / IT lead (2) 
IT specialist (1) 
IT manager (8) 
Manager (2) 
Strategic Health Authority Manager (2) 
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Appendix D: Evidence of Findings of the England Case (NCRS): NPfIT 
Table 6. Institutional Pressures 
Pressure Quote Source 
[1A.CP]  On 1 April 2005, the National Programme joined with the IS/IT 
services from the NHSIA to form a single new organization – NHS 
Connecting for Health. This implements one of the recommendations 
from the Department of Health’s review of its Arm’s Length Bodies 
(ALBs) - one of the first changes to be delivered. It means that NHS 
Connecting for Health has the challenge of maintaining and running 
existing IT services for the NHS, as well as bringing new ones to 
fruition. […] NHS Connecting for Health is formally part of the 
Department of Health, but is managed as an ALB to ensure it has 
flexibility of operation.  
NHS 
Connecting 
for Health 
(2005)19 
[1B.CP]  Health policy documents and technology strategies at the time set out 
the benefits of EHR and HIT more generally. 
Policy: DH 
(200020; 
2002*21) 
Strategy: 
Burns 
(1998)22, DH 
(200123; 
2002) 
 
[2A.CP] 
& 
[2B.CP] 
 …the contract was set out for the South, it constrained not just us but 
probably the supplier as well in terms of us putting workable solutions 
in locally 
 We had to work within the constraints of that contract 
IT Manager, 
Site 1 
 The reason why we implemented (NCRS) was because of tremendous 
government pressure for us to go live. If we didn’t have that pressure, 
we probably would not have gone live. 
Clinical Lead, 
Site 2 
[3A.CP] 
& 
[3B.CP] 
 Connecting for Health sits separately to influence both CSC [LSP] 
and iSoft [Software Developer], yeah, because iSoft have delivered the 
system against requirements specified by Connecting for Health. 
 But actually that contract was not written by the NHS, it’s not 
managed by the NHS it’s managed by this organization called 
Connecting for Health and it’s only loosely connected to what the 
NHS actually need or want.   
LSP Manager 
 The milestones in the plan were set as a contractual milestone so we 
weren’t allowed to alter those. What was quite difficult was we had to 
work backwards from those milestones … that were probably going to 
IT Manager, 
Site 1  
                                                      
19 NHS Connecting for Health (2005) “Better information better health NHS National Programme for IT Annual Report 2004-2005”. 
20 DH (2000). The NHS Plan. Department of Health, London: HMSO. 
21 DH (2002). Shifting the Balance of Power: the next steps. Department of Health, London: HMSO. 
22 Burns, F. (1998). Information for Health: an information strategy for the modern NHS 1998-2005. Leeds: Department of Health, 
NHS Executive. 
23 DH (2001). Building the information core  - implementing the NHS Plan. Department of Health. 
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be unachievable, but we had to work within the constraints of that 
contract”. 
[4A.CP] 
& 
[4B.CP] 
 It doesn’t appear so far as I can tell.  No, no we’re not because we’re 
so late on everything that we owe them [Connecting for Health] 
millions and millions and millions of pounds, so we are, we’re kind of 
not in a very strong position in terms of, we’re not commercially in a 
very strong position 
LSP Manager 
 Despite the view expressed by our interviewee re-negotiating contracts 
with LSPs has proven a challenging task for CfH and DH  with 
contractors accused of contractual breaches tending to counter-sue. 
Campion-
Awwad et al. 
(2014), House 
of Commons 
Public 
Accounts 
Committee 
reports. 
[5.CP]  I think that’s what drives some of the frustration probably from both 
parties sitting at the far end is, you know, if we can’t engage with the 
customer how do we know we’re delivering something that’s going to 
be beneficial … because you’ve not got that direct communication the 
frustration increases 
Software 
Developer, 
Software 
Company 
[6.MP]  The expectations of the role of early adopter site in the NPfIT 
implementation process was presented in official government 
documents, e.g. in report by NHS Connecting for Health “Better 
information better health NHS National Programme for IT Annual 
Report 2004-2005”: 
 “Looking forward, our challenge over the coming year is to continue 
to develop new systems and to roll out those systems which have 
proven successful in early adopter sites. I am confident that our 
Annual Report for 2005-2006 will contain details of our success in 
delivering systems which will help tens of thousands of NHS personnel 
to better serve millions of patients using tools which have been 
delivered by NHS Connecting for Health.” 
NHS 
Connecting 
for Health, 
(2005) p. 324 
 Because a platform was created to learn from the places that got it 
wrong and the places that got it right and to sort of use that as a 
vehicle for securing trouble free deployment through the rest of the 
program 
IT Manager, 
Site 2 
 Once we had gone live with us then I thought, it’s part of my job now 
as a part of the NHS community to make sure other hospitals don’t 
suffer. I wasn’t allowed to tell other hospitals how bad it was”.   
Healthcare 
Professional, 
Site 1 
 We said right, you know, we’ve got three Trusts they all do it that way 
you can’t be that different, why don’t you go and talk to them and find 
out how they do it, and then the Trusts start, we started to have a kind 
of meeting, we started to foster the meetings between the individual 
organizations and it’s much more effective. 
LSP 
representative 
                                                      
24 NHS Connecting for Health (2005) “Better information better health NHS National Programme for IT Annual Report 2004-2005”. 
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[7.CP]  “… our SHA chose two sites to be the first adopters of Cerner … From 
the trust perspective it felt very much it was decision outside of their 
control 
IT Manager, 
Site 1 
 I think you have to take the view that there was almost no choice in 
taking on the system 
Healthcare 
Professional, 
Site 2 
[8.CP]  The system was perceived as being “…imposed rather than we had 
willingly signed up to this. 
Healthcare 
Professional, 
Site 1 
 I think people have used it because they’ve had to and it’s been, you 
know, it’s directive from the trust, and it’s quite clear that that’s what 
we have to do and it would be, you know, you wouldn’t be responding 
to your work and what’s been told of you if you didn’t do it. 
Healthcare 
Professional, 
Site 5 
[9A.CP] 
& 
[9B.NP] 
 Doctors have control to a large extent over what goes on in the trust 
and they are very powerful and they like to do it their way…. They 
easily circumvent the situation and they are able to do  that,  because  
they  just  say,  you  can’t  question  my  professional  judgment. 
SHA Manager 
 The main issues for me from a clinical perspective is we had to do 
business processes without a system, I’d never repeat that again and I 
would say that to, I don’t care who it would be, even if it was the chief 
exec of the trust I would be saying you get me the product then, you 
can influence, you get me the product and then I’ll do it.  Because 
without that it’s very hard to sell anything to clinicians.  
Healthcare 
Professional / 
Clinical Lead, 
Site 5 
[10A.CP] 
& 
[10B.CP] 
 We are being pressured [by the LSP and CfH] into accepting 
suboptimal things and they are being pressured to develop and deliver 
suboptimal products just because of the type of pressure that they are 
under. 
Healthcare 
Professional, 
Site 2 
 A lot of the time you know we, we raise an issue and it sits in the pot, 
you’re saying it’s quite urgent.  And then they’ll come back and say oh 
well actually here’s a functional document that says well this system 
works as designed. 
IT Specialist, 
Site 6 
[11A.CP] 
 
 Connecting for Health can’t force an NHS trust to take a system that 
they don’t want and when it comes to clinical systems they have this 
red card they can wave called clinical risk, so any trust can just say oh 
no it’s too risky and there’s almost nothing we can do about it, you 
know, we could say oh really is it? 
LSP Manager 
 The only control we have is to say, stop, this is unsafe. And that’s 
really the only control we have. That makes them jump. They will do 
things 
Healthcare 
Professional,  
Site 2 
[11B.CP] 
 
 NLOP Board meeting minutes: “the product will not be accepted 
unless it is deemed fit-for-purpose”.  
NPfIT Local 
Ownership 
Program 
(NLOP) 
[11C.CP] 
 
 Clinical safety trumps all cards and they play it whenever they fancy 
it.  So the way to get this stuff live is to work with the Trusts rather 
than Connecting for Health and try and do what they need you to do.  
LSP Manager 
[11D.CP] 
 
 …you always get into the “I’m not going live unless you do this for 
me” so regardless of the original intention the trust always have the 
supplier over a barrel…(Interview). 
Software 
Developer, 
Software 
Company 
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[12.NP]  A clinical lead in one of the hospitals saw his job as “to try and 
disseminate some information to our colleagues and allow it to filter 
through that made them all realize that, look, the system is coming. We 
haven’t got a choice and we might as well make it work rather than 
obstruct it, because at the end of the day, we’ve still got patients to 
look after” (Interview). 
Healthcare 
Professional, 
Site 2 
[13.MP]  It was implicit in this report [NAO, 2008] that clinicians had 
mobilized themselves into a powerful force where they could express 
their concerns about the NPfIT and NCRS in particular. At the same 
time, the British Medical Association had raised concerns about the 
use of electronic records by GPs, particularly as patients had not been 
consulted about plans to upload their summary data on the ‘Spine’ (a 
centralized database). (Currie, 2012, p. 243) 
 BMA advised doctors to boycott the NCRS and not to take part in 
trials of Choose and Book system 
Currie (2012)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sherriff 
(2004)25   
Anonymous 
(2009)26 
[14.NP]  Normative pressures where isomorphic organizational change stems 
from professionalism conspired to delegitimize the cultural acceptance 
of the NPfIT among clinicians. Many hospital consultants and doctors 
voiced serious disquiet that they had not been ‘involved’ in the 
decision making about the NPfIT. They interpreted this as an affront to 
their professional status and position, particularly in their role as the 
guardians of patient safety. 
Currie, 2012, 
p. 242 
[15.CP] 
 
 Article is a response to the Conservative Party commissioned report 
on the future of IT in the NHS. 
 From the Article: ‘Shadow Health Minister Stephen O’Brien accepted 
the recommendations of a review of the National Programme for IT 
(NPfIT) by former British Computer Society chairman Dr Glyn Hayes. 
The report said the national database was ‘unnecessary’ and ‘has 
caused extreme anxiety’ about security.’  
Elledge, J 
(2009)27 
 Article notes, ‘Aspects of the Summary Care Record will be reviewed 
after doctors voiced concerns that patients were not being adequately 
consulted and their medical notes were being uploaded without 
consent. 
 Ministers have written to the British Medical Association saying that, 
while the Government agreed that patient records should be available 
electronically, the process should be clearer for patients. The 
Summary Care Record is being introduced nationally and each 
primary care trust is writing to patients informing them that their 
surgery is about to upload their records unless they opt out. 
Anonymous 
(2010)28 
                                                      
25  Sherriff, L. (2004). BMA tells doctors: avoid NPfIT's flagship project: Patient data still at risk The Register 23 Nov. 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/23/bma_bpfit/. Last accessed 01/02/18. 
26 Anonymous (2009). BMA leader calls for NPfIT to be scrapped, Digital Health 3rd June  
https://www.digitalhealth.net/2009/06/bma-leader-calls-for-npfit-to-be-scrapped/ Last accessed 01/02/18. 
27  Elledge (2009). Tories to scrap central NHS database. GP 21 August. https://www.gponline.com/tories-scrap-central-nhs-
database/article/927463 (accessed 08/05/18). 
28 Anonymous (2010). Doctors’ fears force review of online medical database. The Daily Telegraph, 15 Jun. 
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 There is some suggestion that concerns about confidentiality were 
used by some doctors and the BMA as a cover for more self-interested 
opposition (interview with Brennan, 2014), but it is doubtless that, on 
the whole, the issue of confidentiality was a genuine concern that 
attracted little government attention in the first half of the 1990s. […] 
The medical profession, however, refused to let the issue slide, with 
the BMA engaging Ross Anderson of the University of Cambridge to 
conduct a study into data security in clinical information system. 
Campion-
Awwad et al. 
(2014), p. 10 
[16.CP]  The article makes reference to Privacy International’s description of 
NPfIT as Britain’s ‘most appalling project’. 
Beckett, A 
(2009)29 
[17.CP] 
 
 The article states, “As the delays have built up, so has the impression 
of a government IT scheme, like many before it, gradually sinking into 
a swamp of technical difficulties, ethical disputes, incompetent 
contractors and Whitehall over-ambition, and reckless spending.” 
Beckett, A 
(2009)30 
 From the article, ‘Further evidence has emerged over the findings of 
Labour’s most costly program, the mammoth £12.7bn IT scheme to 
revolutionise the NHS. The Independent has learnt that just 160 health 
organisations out of about 9,000 are using electronic patient records 
under the scheme. The vast majority of those were GP practices. New 
figures have also revealed that millions of pounds have been paid out 
in legal fees. The tax payer has footed a £32.9, bill for “legal and 
commercial support” for the National Programme for IT.’ 
Savage, M 
(2010)31 
 Article notes, ‘The rollout of the Summary Care Record has caused 
such chaos at A&E that the first hospital to gain access has had to 
abandon plans for routine use of the system, Pulse can reveal. 
 ‘The ability for A&E to access patient information held by GPs was 
one of the main rationales for the introduction of the care record. 
 ‘But the document released by Connecting for Health’s Summary Care 
Record Advisory Group reveals Bolton hospital had to abandon plans 
to access records except on the specific request of doctors and even 
then by printing the hard copies.’ 
Nowottny, S 
(2009)32 
[18.CP]  Coercive pressures on CfH over the imposition of new systems on GP 
practices procured as part of NPfIT. 
 Objections raised included: [1] Under the terms of the General 
Medical Services contract, which defines commissioning of GP 
services, GP practices should have a choice over the system they use, 
[2] The clinicians who use the system would become excluded from its 
development, and [3] The products being offered under NPfIT were 
still in development. 
Digitalhealth.
net (2004 
Sept 02)33. 
                                                      
29 Beckett, A. (2009). System failure? The £12.7bn NHS computer programme is five years behind schedule and beset by criticism, 
viruses and fears over patient privacy: So should the world’s biggest IT project be scrapped. The Guardian, 9 Jul, 10 
30 Beckett, A. (2009). System failure? The £12.7bn NHS computer programme is five years behind schedule and beset by criticism, 
viruses and fears over patient privacy: So should the world’s biggest IT project be scrapped. The Guardian, 9 Jul, 10 
31 Savage, M. (2010). Labour’s computer blunders cost £26bn: Ministers blamed for ‘stupendous incompetence’ after taxpayers left 
with huge bills for bungled projects. The Independent, 19 Jan, 4. 
32 Nowottny, S. (2009). Care record: Care records rollout causes chaos in A & E. Pulse, 4 Mar, 6. 
33 Digitalhealth.net (2004). EMIS users urged to protest about systems choice. https://www.digitalhealth.net/2004/09/emis-users-
urged-to-protest-about-systems-choice/ (accessed 24/05/2018). 
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 GPs urged to campaign to retain their choice of system, rather than 
adopt the as-yet untested CareCast system. CareCast was Fujitsu’s 
offer to GPs in the Southern cluster. 
Anonymous 
(2005)34 
 Announcement of the GP Systems of Choice (GPSoC) program, which 
assures GP practices that they can choose from any system that has 
accredited functionality. 
Arnott, S 
(2006)35 
[19.CP]  Our life is much harder since the SHAs came along, this is the local 
ownership. So essentially a lot of the things that we would have been 
able to get approved by Connecting for Health once, so let’s say a 
design document for example. So if we produce a design deliverable 
for something originally Connecting for Health would have approved 
that, so there would be one place, they would approve it on behalf it 
all of the NHS in our cluster. We now have six discreet SHAs, each of 
whom what to approve it and it’s just a fact of life, but, you know, you 
deliver a document to six SHAs who are autonomous organizations we 
will get six times as many comments back, many of them will be 
duplicated, not all of them.  And so there is a role for Connecting for 
Health there to act as coordinators and take some of that kind of pain 
away by dealing on our behalf with this very, very diverse 
organization. 
LSP Manager 
                                                      
34 Anonymous (2005). GPs step up fight for choice of IT system. Pulse, 22 Jan, 7. 
35 Arnott, S. (2006). GP surgeries to get choice of computer systems. Computing, 23 Mar, 5. 
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 Appendix E: Comparison of Singapore and England Contexts 
Table 7. Comparison of Singapore and England Contexts 
Categories  Singapore England 
Institutional 
characteristi
cs: 
Context 
Pop. 2011 5.2 Million 52.6 Million  
Area  720 km2 130,265 km2 
Structure of 
Health Care 
Provision 
Proportion of provision via socialized insurance: around 
34.24% (Year 2011) of the total healthcare expenditure is 
through government subsided or funded care36  
Total healthcare expenditure in 2011 - 2.59% of GDP and 
USD 1377.02 per capita37 
Public healthcare expenditure in 2011 - 34.24% of total and 
USD 471.49 per capita20 
Expenditure of NEHR Project from 2010 to 2012 (NEHR 
Release 1 Implementation) - SGD 109,699,80338 
Expenditure of other IT project for NEHR (such as NHELP) 
in 2014 - SGD 2,088,670 39 
Acute Care: Hospital provision is mainly through public 
hospitals (80%). 
No. of hospitals in 2011 - public 7, private 7, not-for-profit 
1  (~1:374000 per population)40 
Proportion of provision via socialized insurance: 
around 83.3% of healthcare expenditure is through 
National Health Service (NHS) provided care43 
Public healthcare expenditure (through NHS) in 
2011 - 83.3% of total and GBP 1939.16 per capita 
Expenditure of NPfIT at program close in 
September 2011 - GBP 6.4 Billion44 
Budget allocated to NPfIT from 2004 to 2014 - 
GBP 14.0 Billion45 
Acute Care: Hospital provision is mainly through 
public hospitals with some services for the NHS 
purchased from private providers.  
No. of acute sites expected to receive NCRS - 122 
(~1:431100 per population)46  
                                                      
36 Index Mundi (2015). Singapore - Health Expenditure. https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/singapore/health-expenditure (accessed 24/05/2018) 
37 MOF (2012). Expenditure Estimates by Head of Expenditure - Ministry of Health. https://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/budget_2012/revenue_expenditure/attachment/35%20MOH%202012.pdf (accessed at 24/05/2018 
38 MOF (2013). Expenditure Estimates by Head of Expenditure - Ministry of Health. https://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/budget_2013/revenue_expenditure/attachment/35%20MOH%202013.pdf (accessed at 24/05/2018) 
39 MOF (2014). Expenditure Estimates by Head of Expenditure - Ministry of Health. https://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/data/budget_2014/download/35%20MOH%202014.pdf (accessed at 24/05/2018) 
40 Data.gov.sg (2018). Number of Acute Hospitals and Specialty Centres. https://data.gov.sg/dataset/number-of-acute-hospitals-and-specialty-centres?view_id=692502e2-2cfd-46be-9c9c-
fc66a243013f&resource_id=04730f40-620b-4c14-9bd7-1522dc09dde1 (accessed at 24/05//2018) 
43 Commission on the Future of Health and Social Care in England (2014) The UK Private Health Market. The King’s Fund: London. 
44 DH (2011). Dismantling the National Programme for IT (Press Release: 22 Sept. 2011). London: Department of Health. 
45 Comptroller and Auditor General (2011). The National Programme for IT in the NHS – An Update on the Delivery of Detailed Care Records Systems. London: The 
Stationery Office. 
46 Comptroller and Auditor General (2011). The National Programme for IT in the NHS – An Update on the Delivery of Detailed Care Records Systems. London: The 
Stationery Office. 
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No. of hospital beds in 2011 - public sector 8935 and 
private sector 2459  (~ 1:492 per population)41 
Doctors per population in 2011 - 1:540 
Nurses per population in 2011 - 1:163 
Primary Care: Provision is mainly through private general 
practitioners (80%) with some public provision through 
polyclinics (20%). 
No. of GPs in 2010/2014 -  1386/1406 (~ 1:4007 per 
population)42 
NHS medical and dental staff in acute and 
community care per population in 2011 -  1:52947 
Primary Care: Provision is mainly through private 
contractors providing services to the NHS.  
No. of GPs in 2011 - 8316 (~ 1:6325 per 
population)  
No. of general practitioners in NHS per population 
in 2011 - 1:1489 
Funding for 
Health Care 
Patients need to co-pay nearly all healthcare services. 
Hospital services were funded mainly through direct 
taxation in the form of government subsidies. These 
subsidies can cover up to 80% of total acute public hospital 
bill. Polyclinics services were funded by the government. 
For private GPs, the expenses are generally paid by the 
patient themselves. Singapore government provide some 
income-tested programs or schemes for GPs.48 
NHS healthcare was funded mainly through direct 
taxation meaning most services are without charge 
at the point of delivery. Means-tested co-payments 
are required for community pharmacy, dental care 
and optometry services provided by the NHS.  
Historical 
Infrastructur
e for Health 
Informatics 
Prior to the National Electronic Health Record (NEHR) 
program, provision in Singapore has been divided into two 
clusters for the delivery of health care.  
Acute Care: With regard to the public sector, each cluster 
had its own electronic medical record (EMR) system, 
developed to different standards. In 2004 a document 
exchange system EMRX was introduced, although this did 
not allow the exchange of semantic data, or the exchange of 
diagnostic medical imagery.  
Prior to the National Programme for IT (NPfIT) a 
range of initiatives had attempted to introduce 
health informatics use.  
Acute Care: Public acute care had adopted a range 
of electronic medical record (EMR) systems 
although there were few agreed standards and 
uptake was on a trust by trust basis. 
Primary Care: GP practices and community 
pharmacies supplying services to the NHS adopted 
health informatics systems. The former adopted 
                                                      
41 Data.gov.sg (2018). Number of Hospital Beds. https://data.gov.sg/dataset/number-of-hospital-beds?view_id=59ec5f76-411b-42d7-9b8a-
6bce08be1a65&resource_id=9df79e72-a7ed-4df3-9a60-5fe434f38fe7 (accessed at 24/05/2018) 
42 MOH (2013). Financing. https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/costs_and_financing/financing.html (accessed 24/05/2018) & MOH (2014). 
Primary Care Survey 2014 Report. https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/Publications/Reports/2017/primary-care-survey-2014-report.html 
(accessed 24/05/2018) 
47 The Health and Social Care Information Centre. NHS Workforce: Summary of Staff in the NHS: Results from September 2011. Leeds, UK: The Health and Social 
Care Information Centre; 2012. 
48 MOH (2015). Medisave for Chronic Disease Management Programme (CDMP) and vaccinations. https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/policies-and-
issues/elderly_healthcare.html (accessed 24/05/2018) 
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Primary Care: In the private sector there was limited 
adoption of EMR systems (less than 30% by 2014). 
 
electronic health records (EHRs) to meet 
contractual changes with state subsidies promoting 
system use, the latter driven by stock control and 
patient record keeping requirements. 
Project 
Organization 
Organizatio
nal 
Landscape 
and 
Stakeholder
s in System 
Delivery 
The Ministry of Health (MOH) was responsible for setting 
policies of NEHR.  
Ministry of Health Holdings (MOHH) undertook NEHR 
project management on behalf of MOH. It defined the 
architecture of NEHR and was responsible for the delivery 
of NEHR, which was supported by IHIS and Accenture-led 
consortium.  
Integrated Health Information System (IHIS) is a subsidiary 
of MOHH and worked with the IT teams from MOHH in 
the integration of different IT systems and NEHR. It 
focused on a technical perspective, and extracted, 
transformed and mapped relevant data for NEHR database. 
IHIS also worked with IT vendors and commercial solution 
providers (i.e., Accenture-led consortium). The NEHR 
systems and the infrastructure were developed and 
deployed by the commercial solution providers. They are 
also responsible for the integration of the legacy systems 
and NEHR systems.  
The Department of Health (DH) was responsible 
for national policy which included NPfIT, and for 
on health and social care. Below DH, Strategic 
Health Authorities (SHAs) provided regional 
oversight and commissioned capital expenditure 
projects. Local Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) were 
responsible for local commissioning of services.  
DH created Connecting for Health (CfH) to 
provide an arms-length body to commission and 
assure local and national NPfIT services provided 
by health information system suppliers. National 
services included a national network for data 
exchange and the creation of services for a national 
Summary Care Record (SCR) amongst others. 
Originally, NPfIT solutions for acute and primary 
care were delivered by regional Local Service 
Providers. These would be abolished and replaced 
by SHAs and PCTs in the National Local 
Ownership Program. SHAs were responsible for 
acute care health informatics, PCTs for primary 
care. 
Delivery 
Agencies for 
Health 
Informatics 
There was a steering committee (Clinical Advisory Group) 
co-chaired by MOHH CIO that looked after various NEHR 
clinical informatics alongside the governance aspects. IHIS 
also had the task of supporting the creation of a 
consolidated, strengthened health informatics workforce 
since it worked with MOHH in the standardization of 
clinical information. Accenture-led consortium worked 
with MOHH for NEHR solution development, which 
included technical, clinical and information governance. 
Connecting for Health (CfH) was responsible for 
commissioning NPfIT’s national architecture, for 
procurement of systems at national and regional 
level, and for assuring that systems met expected 
standards. Systems were provided by private sector 
companies. The Health and Social Care 
Information Centre (HSCIC) was responsible for 
developing data standards whilst Strategic Health 
Authorities (SHAs) took responsibility for regional 
delivery. 
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Funding 
arrangement
s/incentives 
Funding Source: MOH and MOHH provided all funding 
for delivery and implementation of the NEHR systems. 
MOHH had offset NEHR costs from the start till it went 
live in April 2011.  
Acute Care: NEHR systems and their integration with 
current EMR systems were provided without charge for 
sites through the solution providers. Suppliers received 
funding for reaching development milestones. 
Primary Care: Community hospital and polyclinics were 
integrated without charge. However, though the NEHR 
system and the integration was free, GP clinics and nursing 
homes did not get full financial support for IT infrastructure 
to connect to NEHR.  
Funding Source: DH provided all funding for 
delivery and implementation of new systems, and 
for upgrading of existing systems. 
Acute Care: Systems provided without charge for 
sites through the LSP. Suppliers received funding 
for reaching development milestones. 
Primary Care: Systems procured by PCTs for GP 
practices. Community pharmacies received DH 
payment to upgrade. Suppliers received money 
from contracts with PCTs or sites. 
  
Contract and 
Delivery 
Monitoring 
MOHH was responsible for monitoring the implementation 
of NEHR and it needed to report the progress regularly to 
MOH. 
CfH was initially responsible for oversight of 
contracts, then SHAs as part of NLOP 
arrangements.  
Delivery of 
systems 
Design 
Choices in 
Planned 
Systems and 
Services 
NEHR system was developed with a centralized database, 
which could be accessed through the integrated entry or 
online Web portal. New IT infrastructure was also 
developed for its connection. 
Acute Care: Existing EMR systems were integrated with 
the new NEHR system. Existing data exchange system 
EMRX was replaced. Daily summary records are pushed 
into NEHR system. 
Primary Care: The MOH-funded systems (such as 
GPConnect for GP clinics and NHELP for nursing homes) 
are linked with NEHR system. 
NPfIT was developed around a National Network 
for the NHS (N3) and a set of centralized Spine 
services. Only systems with CfH accredited 
functionality were allowed to connect to N3 and 
exchange data with the Spine. 
Acute Care: Existing EMR systems were to be 
replaced with new systems provided by contractors 
for NPfIT. The new EMR systems would have 
access to Spine services.  
Primary Care: Spine service functionality added to 
existing systems. A daily extract from GP practice 
EHR systems would form the basis of a Spine 
hosted Summary Care Record, accessible across 
the NHS.  
Social Care and Child Protection: Areas not 
considered in scope for NPfIT. 
Processes 
Deployed in 
System 
Acute Care: Top-down implementation model with NEHR 
system provided by commercial solution providers for 
public sector acute and community hospitals. Supplemented 
Acute Care: Top-down delivery model with 
information systems supplied by LSPs. 
Supplemented by bottom-up design efforts through 
inter-health care trust meetings. 
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Implementat
ion 
by bottom-up design efforts through consultations, CMIOs 
and workforce groups. 
Primary Care: Top-down implementation model with “soft 
approaches”, such as IT-enable programs and funding. 
Primary Care: Bottom-up adoption of services 
provided as part of existing primary care 
information systems. 
Resources 
Available 
  
Primary Care: MOH set aside a budget of S$20 million for 
an Early Contribution Incentive (for GPs and nursing 
homes to encourage the early contribution of data to NEHR 
from GP clinics and nursing homes.49 In addition, there 
exist IT-enabled programs (such as CLEO/GP Connect for 
GP clinics and NHELP for nursing homes), which provide 
IT infrastructure at a low cost and integrate the links to 
NEHR and other public healthcare resources.50 
Acute Care: a Deployment Incentive Fund of £1 
million per site was available for early adopter 
sites for Care Records Service adoption. 
Primary Care: technical and business process 
support was made available by CfH to support the 
early adopters of new primary care information 
services. 
Outcomes  By the middle of 2012 (at the end of NEHR Phase 2), 
NEHR completed Phase 1 mostly on time by achieving its 
initial scope of involving all public-sector healthcare 
institutes, 6 community hospitals, 2 nursing homes, the 
armed forces and 50 GPs (Hui, 2012). 
By March of 2013: The system has been rolled out to 
almost 5000 clinical users in the public healthcare sector, 
including 8 hospitals, 6 specialty centres, and all 
polyclinics.   
 
At the close of NPfIT in 2011, 19 of the 122 acute 
sites (15.6%), GP sites in 10% NHS organizations, 
44 of the 90 community healthcare sites (48.9%) 
and 21 of 56 mental health care sites (37.5%) that 
were expected to adopt NCRS, had done so.51 
Although the NPfIT program has closed the 
national infrastructures identifying patients, 
transmitting prescriptions and sharing SCR data 
remains. A range of new funds have been created 
to support adoption of EMR systems into acute 
care, and to contribute to a new Integrated Digital 
Care Record. 
 
 
                                                      
49 IHIS (2017). For Immediate Release - Early Contribution Incentive for Healthcare Licensees. https://www.ihis.com.sg/Latest_News/Media_Releases/Documents/2017%20Media%20Releases/Factsheet%20-
%20ECI%20(as%20of%208%20Nov).pdf (accessed 24/05/2018) 
50 MOH (2018). Contributing Data to the NEHR 
https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/dam/moh_web/HCSA/Docu/MOH%20P2%20Consult%20Session%20NEHR_v0.11.pdf (accessed 24/05/2018) 
51 Comptroller and Auditor General (2011). The National Programme for IT in the NHS – An Update on the Delivery of Detailed Care Records Systems. London: The 
Stationery Office. 
